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ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION,
PETER B. RUTLEDGE (CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2013)
S.L Strong*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the immortal words of Grease, some things "go together,
like rama-lama-lama, ka-dinga-da-dinga-dong."I Though everyone
has their own list of favorite pairings, some sure-fire winners are
hot dogs and baseball, Mom and apple pie, Justice Scalia and origi-
nal intent.
Other combinations are not so easy to anticipate, at least until
some far-reaching visionary has taken that all-important first step,
leading the rest of the world to say "yes, of course, we see it now."
Again, individual preferences vary, but some possible unions in-
clude surfing and kite flying (now an Olympic sport),2 bacon and
chocolate (now available at an internet source near you),' and arbi-
tration and constitutional law.
This last item is the topic of Professor Peter Rutledge's new
book from Cambridge University Press, Arbitration and the Consti-
tution,4 and the focus of this review essay, which will consider,
among other things, whether these two subjects are as compatible
as, say, hot dogs and baseball. The core of the analysis appears in
Part II, which outlines and evaluates the material presented by
* Ph.D. (law), University of Cambridge (U.K.); D.Phil., University of Oxford (U.K.); J.D.,
Duke University; M.P.W., University of Southern California; B.A., University of California, Da-
vis. The author, who is admitted to practice as an attorney in New York and Illinois and as a
solicitor in England and Wales, is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Missouri and
Senior Fellow at the Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution.
1 See We Go Together, on GREASE: THE ORIGINAL SOUNDTRACK FROM THE MOTION PIC-
TURE (1978).
2 See Kiteboarding to Replace Windsurfing at 2016 Rio Olympics, BBC (May 7, 2012), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/olympics/17980607.
3 See VOSGES HAUT CHOCOLATE, http://www.vosgeschocolate.com/product/baconexotic
candy-.bar/exotic-candy-bars.
4 See PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (2013).
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Rutledge in his book. This section sets the book within the context
of existing forms of constitutional and arbitral scholarship and con-
siders whether Rutledge succeeds in his bold experiment of blend-
ing together two such seemingly diverse areas of law.
Most book reviewers appear to spend an inordinate amount of
time faulting authors for not including various topics that the re-
viewers believe are important. Rather than criticizing Rutledge for
a book that could have been, but was not in fact written, those
types of aspirational comments are limited to Part III, entitled "A
Reviewer's Wish List." That section covers what, in this reviewer's
mind, should be covered in the second edition of the book, for
there is no doubt that a second edition is warranted. Indeed, as
this essay will show, the intersection between arbitration and con-
stitutional law is an important topic deserving of serious scholarly
attention.
II. THE FIRST EDITION
A. Preliminary Matters
Rutledge is not the first commentator to contemplate the con-
nections between constitutional law and arbitration. Over the
years, others have touched on various aspects of the relationship
between the two fields, considering issues ranging from state action
and due process to treaty interpretation and comparative constitu-
tional law.' However, up until now, no one has attempted to ad-
5 See Gary B. Born, Arbitration and the Freedom to Associate, 38 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 7,
17-20 (2009); Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 186, 210-14
(2006); Petra Butler, The International Bill of Rights: The Bed International Commercial Arbitra-
tion Wants to Lie In? (forthcoming 2013); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Arbitration and State Action,
2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6-51; Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Law-
making: The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 125, 175 & n.197
(2005); Roger J. Peristadt, Article III Judicial Power and the Federal Arbitration Act, 62 Am. U.
L. REV. 201, 239 (2012); Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alter-
native Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 989-1104 (2000); Peter
B. Rutledge, Arbitration and Article III, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1189, 1189-1234 (2008) [hereinafter
Rutledge, Article III]; Jean Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's
Preference for Biding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and
Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Sternlight, Constitutionality]; S.I.
Strong, Beyond the Self-Execution Analysis: Rationalizing Constitutional, Treaty and Statutory
Interpretation in International Commercial Arbitration, 53 VA. J. INT'L L. 499 (2013) [hereinafter
Strong, Constitutional]; S.I. Strong, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Against Foreign States or
State Agencies, 26 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 335, 338-54 (2006) [hereinafter Strong, FSIA]; S.I.
2013] CONSTITUTIONAL CONUNDRUMS 43
dress the constitutionality of arbitration in a comprehensive and
methodical manner. As a result, the scope of the Rutledge text
provides certain unique benefits not available elsewhere.
One of the other advantages of Arbitration and the Constitu-
tion is its timeliness. Over the last few years, the United States
Supreme Court has become fascinated with arbitration.6 A num-
ber of these matters carry constitutional implications, and it is
likely that any cases that come to the Court in the future will turn
even more clearly on matters of constitutional import.8
The situation is even more pressing elsewhere in the judiciary.
Lower courts are clearly struggling with a variety of constitutional
concerns, ranging from matters arising under the Bill of Rights9 to
Strong, International Arbitration and the Republic of Colombia: Commercial, Comparative and
Constitutional Concerns From a U.S. Perspective, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 47, 99-105 (2011)
[hereinafter Strong, Colombia]; S.I. Strong, Invisible Barriers to the Enforcement of Foreign Ar-
bitral Awards in the United States, 21 J. INT'L ARB. 439, 445-52 (2004) [hereinafter Strong, Invisi-
ble Barriers]; S.I. Strong, Monism and Dualism in International Commercial Arbitration:
Overcoming Barriers to Consistent Application of Principles of Public International Law, in
MARKO NOVAKOVIt (ED.), BASIC CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: MONISM & Du-
ALISM 547 (2013); Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications for
Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1745-67 (2006) [hereinafter Weston,
Universes].
6 The Supreme Court has heard ten arbitration cases in the last five years. See Am. Express
Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct.
2064 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Granite Rock Co. v.
Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010); Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130
S. Ct. 2772 (2010); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animaleeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); Arthur
Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456
(2009); Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262 (2009); Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel,
Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
7 For example, several recent matters have addressed the issue of federal preemption, which
gives rise to Supremacy Clause concerns. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Sutter, 133 S. Ct. at 2064;
AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1740; RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 79-124.
8 See Strong, Constitutional, supra note 5 (discussing the types and number of arbitration
cases that have recently sought certiorari for constitutional reasons).
9 Most such cases involve the Due Process Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Frontera
Resources Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil of Azerbaijan Repub., 582 F.3d 393, 398-401 (2d Cir.
2009); TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukraine, 411 F.3d 296, 299-302 (D.C. Cir. 2005);
Dardana Ltd. v. A.O. Yuganskneftegaz, 317 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2003); Glencore Grain Rotter-
dam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1120-28 (9th Cir. 2002); Base Metal
Trading Ltd. v. OJSC "Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory," 283 F.3d 208, 214-15 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 101 (2002). However, some disputes have also been decided under the First
Amendment. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I; Del. Coalition for Open Gov't v. Strine, 894 F. Supp.
2d 493 (D. Del. 2012, on appeal No. 12-3859 (3d. Cir.)); John W. Joyce, Private Arbitrations
Ruled Unconstitutional: Delaware Chancery Court Procedure Violates First Amendment, 38 LIT.
NEWS 12, 12 (Spring 2013).
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those under the Supremacy Clause."o This phenomenon (i.e., the
constitutionalization of arbitration) is consistent with examples
seen in other countries, where an increasing number and diversity
of constitutional claims relating to arbitration are being brought."
Furthermore, a number of research organizations, including the
American Law Institutel2 and the Federal Judicial Center," have
recently focused their attention on arbitration and have reflected
the kind of sophisticated doctrinall 4 and theoretical" analyses that
are increasingly becoming the norm in both domestic and interna-
10 See Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 587 F.3d 714,
732-33 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 65 (2010); see also ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich
Ins. plc, 685 F.3d 376, 390-91 (4th Cir. 2012); Suter v. Munich Reins. Co., 223 F.3d 150, 162 (3d
Cir. 2000); Stephens v. Am. Int'l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995); Strong, Constitutional, supra
note 5.
11 See Lea Haber Kuck & Gregory A. Litt, International Class Arbitration, in WORLD CLASS
ACIONS: A GUIDE To GROUP AND REPRESENTATIVE AcTIONS AROUND THE GLOBE 700,
720-23 (Paul Karlsgodt ed., 2012); Strong, Colombia, supra note 5, at 87, 93-99, 99-105 (2011).
12 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION (forthcoming); George A. Bermann, Restating the U.S. Law of International Commer-
cial Arbitration, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 175, 175-99 (2009).
13 See S.I. STRONG, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A GUIDE FOR U.S.
JUDGES (2012) [hereinafter STRONG, GUIDE]; S.I. STRONG, AN INTRODUCTION To ALTERNA-
TIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter STRONG,
ADR]. The Federal Judicial Center is the research and education arm of the U.S. federal
judiciary.
14 Arbitration has often been characterized as a practical, rather than doctrinal, discipline,
likely as a result of the fact that arbitral awards do not create formal precedent. See Ernest A.
Young, Supranational Rulings as Judgments and Precedents, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 477,
501-09 (2008). However, some types of soft precedent do exist in arbitration. See Gabrielle
Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?, 23 ARB. INT'L 357, 361-78
(2007); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Towards a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1895, 1909-10 (2010). Furthermore, courts can become involved in arbitral disputes in a
variety of ways and can therefore produce binding precedent relating to arbitration. See GARY
B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2951-65 (2009); S.I. Strong, Navigating
the Borders Between International Commercial Arbitration and U.S. Federal Courts: A Jurispru-
dential GPS, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 158-206.
15 Arbitration has often been said to be under-theorized. See EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LE-
GAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2-3 (2010). However, scholars have under-
taken a wide range of rigorous theoretical analyses, thereby dispelling this particular myth. See
id.; Stavros L. Brekoulakis, International Arbitration Scholarship and the Concept of Arbitration
Law, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 745 (2013); Amy J. Cohen, Dispute Systems Design, Neoliberalism,
and the Problem of Scale, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 51, 80 (2009); Susan D. Franck, Integrating
Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. 161, 177-78 (2007);
Anna Spain, Integration Matters: Rethinking the Architecture of International Dispute Resolu-
tion, 32 U. PA. INT'L L. J. 1, 46-47 (2010); S.I. Strong, Arbitration of International Business
Disputes: Maturity and Methodology, 29 ARB. INT'L - (forthcoming 2013); S.I. Strong, Does
Class Arbitration "Change the Nature" of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, A T&T and a Return to First
Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 241-58 (2012) [hereinafter Strong, First Principles];
Weidemaier, supra note 14, at 1899-1952.
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tional arbitration. Collectively, these developments suggest that
the time is ripe for a serious and comprehensive study of the con-
stitutional implications of arbitration.
Methodologically, Arbitration and the Constitution has two
distinct aims.
First, as a positive matter, the book aims to chart systematically
the breakdown of the wall separating ... [arbitration and consti-
tutional law] and the alloying of their various principles. Sec-
ond, as a normative matter, this book also (at times) critiques
these developments.16
The book also adopts an intriguing and ambitious thematic
goal, with Rutledge presenting as his thesis the idea that
[o]ver the past half century, constitutional norms increasingly
have worked their way into arbitration law and, to a lesser ex-
tent, arbitration law has influenced the development of constitu-
tional norms. Tellingly, this seepage between the two disciplines
has not occurred with a great deal of systematic thought or de-
liberation. Instead, it has tended to take place through incre-
mental developments in various fields of arbitration, often
occurring in isolation from each other and with little considera-
tion of the broader implications of the growing interconnectivity
of these two disciplines.1 7
This emphasis on subtle forms of "seepage" rather than more
direct doctrinal influences allows Rutledge to integrate case law
and analysis from surprisingly diverse areas of law and to expand
his discussion beyond well-known landmark cases within the core
of the arbitral canon.1 8 Furthermore, the breadth of the analytical
framework permits (if not requires) the introduction of examples
from the entirety of arbitration law. Indeed, the text is peppered
with references to a wide variety of arbitral procedures, including
those involving investment, employment and consumer disputes, 19
although Rutledge sensibly limits most of his analysis to a single
area of law, namely commercial arbitration.2 0
In many authors' hands, this type of wide-ranging discussion
could prove problematic, since the various types of arbitration are
16 RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 5.
17 Id.
18 See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
19 Chapter 2, for example, focuses primarily on treaty-based arbitration. See infra notes
47-62 and accompanying text.
20 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 8.
2013] 45
46 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION [Vol. 15:41
quite distinct as a practical and jurisprudential matter. 21 However,
Rutledge has written extensively on many different forms of arbi-
tration and is therefore well-suited to this type of diverse cross-
disciplinary analysis.22 Furthermore, the ability to draw from so
many different types of dispute resolution mechanisms yields a
much more interesting and jurisprudentially rigorous discussion
than would be possible in a single-subject study.
Structurally, the book is arranged into three sections of two
chapters each, resulting in six numbered chapters in addition to a
short introduction and conclusion. Given its ambitious scope, the
text is relatively short, coming in at just over 200 pages. 2 3 How-
ever, the length is consistent with the author's apparent aim to pro-
duce a text suitable for readers from a variety of backgrounds
rather than create a comprehensive treatise appropriate only for
specialists within a narrow field.
The first section of the book introduces basic issues relating to
separation of powers. Chapter 1 focuses on the "structural limits
on Congress's ability to require judicial enforcement of an arbitra-
tor's award absent de novo review of the award" while Chapter 2
discusses certain specialized forms of arbitration, including arbitra-
tion under various international trade agreements such as the
North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA).2 4 In some ways, this is
the weakest section of the book, not because of any analytical
flaws, but simply as a matter of presentation, which appears some-
what rushed. It is unfortunate that these chapters are the reader's
first introduction to Rutledge's ideas, since the book grows
stronger as it goes on.
21 See id. at 6-7; STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 13, at 4-5.
22 See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 1157-1228 (2011); Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Con-
tract and Procedure, 94 MARO. L. REV. 1103 (2011); Rutledge, Article III, supra note 5, at 1189;
Peter B. Rutledge, The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, 16 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 4
(2009); Peter B. Rutledge, Convergence and Divergence in International Dispute Resolution, 2012
J. DIsp. RESOL. 49 [hereinafter Rutledge, Convergence]; Peter B. Rutledge, Market Solutions to
Market Problems: Re-Examining Arbitral Immunity as a Solution to Unfairness in Securities Ar-
bitration, 26 PACE L. REV. 113 (2005); Peter B. Rutledge, Toward a Contractual Approach for
Arbitral Immunity, 39 GA. L. REV. 151 (2004); Peter B. Rutledge, TRIPS and BITS: An Essay
on Compulsory Licenses, Expropriation, and International Arbitration, 13 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON.
149 (2012); Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against the Arbitration
Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267 (2008); Peter B. Rutledge & Anna W. How-
ard, Arbitrating Disputes Between Companies and Individuals: Lessons From Abroad, 65 DISP.
RESOL. J. 30 (2010).
23 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 1-208.
24 Id. at 9; see also North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., ch. 11, Dec. 17,
1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
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The second section also considers separation of powers issues,
but on a vertical rather than horizontal plane. Thus, Chapter 3 dis-
cusses the Federal Arbitration Act 2 5 and the extent to which that
enactment applies to individual U.S. states, while Chapter 4 consid-
ers choice-of-law provisions in the context of federalism.2 6 In this
discussion, Rutledge is able to draw on and critique the work of
numerous courts and commentators, although the book provides
its own unique perspective on the various issues.
The third section shifts away from structural issues in constitu-
tional law and focuses instead on "the relationship between arbi-
tration and individual liberties." 2 7 Chapter 5 therefore considers
whether arbitration constitutes state action, while Chapter 6 dis-
cusses whether arbitration impermissibly infringes on the constitu-
tional right to a jury trial. These issues have been relatively well-
addressed by both courts and commentators, which allows Rut-
ledge to contrast his analytical innovations to preexisting law and
practice in a useful and interesting manner. The book then con-
cludes with a brief discussion of overarching themes and areas of
future research.
Having introduced the basic structure of the text, it is time to
consider Rutledge's analysis in more detail. Each of the three sub-
stantive sections is considered separately, as is the book's
conclusion.
B. Separation of Powers
Arbitration and the Constitution begins with a separation of
powers discussion arising out of Articles 1128 and 11129 of the U.S.
Constitution. Although this is for many readers an extremely in-
teresting topic, since few people conceptualize arbitration in the
25 See 9 U.S.C. §§1-307 (2012).
26 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 9-10.
27 Id. at 10-11.
28 See U.S. CONsT. art. II, §2., cl. 2 (stating that the president "shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be estab-
lished by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Depart-
ments"); see id. art. II, §3 (stating that the president "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed").
29 See id. art. III, §1 ("The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Su-
preme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.").
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context of separation of powers concerns, the discussion is unfortu-
nately the weakest of the book. Ironically, the majority of the
problems appear to arise because the author is trying to do too
much in too brief a space. As a result, the analysis is often con-
clusory in nature, which can create a certain amount of confusion
in the reader's mind.
Chapter 1 begins by focusing on whether arbitration imper-
missibly ousts the constitutional jurisdiction of Article III courts. 0
As Rutledge correctly notes, this issue was at one time quite prob-
lematic for arbitration, since the concept of widespread contractual
freedom to grant jurisdiction to a private arbitrator is largely an
invention of the late twentieth century.31 This is not to say that
arbitration was non-existent prior to contemporary times, since
there is evidence (including the existence of an arbitration provi-
sion in George Washington's will) that suggests that arbitration was
not as rare or disfavored in the early years of the United States as
is sometimes believed. 32  However, the routine use of arbitration
may have been restricted to certain limited subject-matter areas,
geographic regions and/or socio-economic groups.3 3
In considering the Article III argument, Rutledge reviews sev-
eral rationales supporting the constitutionality of arbitration. For
example, arbitration is often deemed constitutionally valid because
the parties are said to "have waived their right to an Article III
30 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 16-17. But see Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S.
263, 270, 277-79 (1932) (considering the Article III issue and allowing specific performance of an
arbitration agreement in the admiralty context).
31 See BORN, supra note 14, at 39-49, 57-58; RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 16-17; Peristadt,
supra note 5, at 239; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Court-
house at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIo ST. J. Disp.
RESOL. 297, 309-24 (1996) (reviewing the history of the contemporary alternative dispute resolu-
tion movement). However, there are some fields (such as trust law) where concerns still exist
about whether arbitration impermissibly ousts the jurisdiction of the courts. See Lawrence Co-
hen & Marcus Staff, The Arbitration of Trust Disputes, 7 J. INT'L TR. & CORP. PLAN. 203, 209
(1999); S.I. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes: Two Bodies of Law Collide, 45 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1157, 1196-1208 (2012). However, prejudices against arbitration may be disap-
pearing even in trust law. See id. Additional concerns may exist in the context of requests for
discovery under 28 U.S.C. §1782, since questions have arisen as to whether magistrate judges are
constitutionally capable of deciding such matters. See 28 U.S.C. §1782 (2012); S.I. Strong, Dis-
covery Under 28 U.S. C. §1782: Distinguishing International Commercial Arbitration and Interna-
tional Investment Arbitration, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEx LITIG. 295 (2013).
32 See David Horton, The Federal Arbitration Act and Testamentary Instruments, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 1027, 1035 (2012).
33 See Carli N. Conklin, Lost Options for Mutual Gain? The Lawyer, the Layperson, and
Dispute Resolution in Early America, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 581 (2013); Carli N. Conk-
lin, Transformed, Not Transcended: The Role of Extrajudicial Dispute Resolution in Antebellum
Kentucky and New Jersey, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 39 (2006).
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forum."3 4 However, Rutledge finds that approach problematic to
the extent that it is based on the presumption that Article III rights
are personal to the litigant and thus waivable.3 5  The text in-
troduces a number of decisions ranging from Printz v. United
States3 6 to US. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partner-
ship"7 to support the proposition that Article III rights are not sub-
ject to individual waiver, but this discussion is unfortunately
marred by its brevity, a problem that also arises elsewhere. In
many cases, the problem may be a function of the book's overall
length, since 208 pages do not allow detailed discussion of numer-
ous issues. However, Rutledge does himself a disservice by not
fleshing out his arguments more completely.39
Chapter 1 moves on to consider several other theories regard-
ing Article III concerns, devoting a short paragraph to each before
settling on appellate review theory as the analytical paradigm of
choice.4 0 According to this model, arbitration is legally defensible
because judicial review of arbitral awards affords courts with a con-
stitutionally sufficient amount of oversight over the dispute.4 1 In
this section, Rutledge modifies the conventional approach some-
what by relying on a number of cases and theories from outside the
arbitral field, an analytical technique that is consistent with his de-
sire to place arbitration law within a larger body of constitutional
analysis. 4 2 A number of Rutledge's propositions (such as his state-
ment that "[t]he upshot of .. . the modified appellate review theory
is to vary the degree of constitutionally required review along two
axes" 43) are intriguingly complex and merit more detailed discus-
sion, since they suggest an entirely new way of looking at the way
in which judicial review operates.4 4
34 RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 18.
35 See id. at 19-20, 22.
36 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
37 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
38 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 23.
39 For example, in various places throughout the book, Rutledge simply cites a proposition
that is said to be associated with the relevant decision, and then either agrees or disagrees with
the characterization noted. See, e.g., id. at 23, 28-31, 38-39. Unfortunately, this type of ap-
proach does not allow the reader to form his or her own conclusions about the strength of the
argument or the relevance of the authorities cited.
40 See id. at 24-25.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 5.
43 Id. at 39.
44 For example, the mathematical reference may warrant a graphic of some sort, although
Rutledge may have concluded that any type of visual aid that was even vaguely reminiscent of
algebra or geometry would unnerve those lawyers who are math-phobic. See id.
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The book considers the viability of appellate review theory
with respect to three different types of proceedings: private com-
mercial arbitration, NAFTA arbitration and investment arbitra-
tion.4 5 Although this section demonstrates the author's facility
with a wide range of arbitration law, the presentation could be
somewhat confusing to those readers who are not as familiar with
each of these individual processes. 46 Therefore, it might be useful
if Rutledge spent a bit more time describing the various procedures
and explaining why each example is relevant to the overall theme
of the book.
The next chapter, Chapter 2, remains within the same general
subject matter area as Chapter 1 (i.e., separation of powers) but
moves from an Article III judicial branch analysis to an Article II
executive branch analysis. 47 Here, Rutledge departs from his usual
focus on commercial and other forms of private arbitration and in-
stead concentrates on various types of treaty-based arbitration that
might be said to infringe on certain executive powers.4 8
Rather than taking an expansive approach to the issue, Rut-
ledge frames his analysis within the context of a single long-run-
ning dispute involving Canadian softwood lumber. 4 9 He begins by
discussing various issues relating to the Appointments Clause,
which is an approach that has been used by a number of other
45 See id. at 44-53.
46 For example, the discussion of commercial arbitration considers both domestic and inter-
national proceedings, which could be problematic if readers do not have a grasp of the funda-
mental differences between the two mechanisms. See id. at 44-49. Although the author has
correctly stated the basic propositions of law, most readers will not have the same facility with
the cases and context as the author and therefore will not be able to judge the propriety of the
various proposals and conclusions contained in this section.
47 See U.S. CONsT. arts. II-III; RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 54-55.
48 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 55. The emphasis here is on trade and investment arbitra-
tion, which both involve public law proceedings against a state or state entity. See id. Although
international commercial arbitration also involves certain international treaties and can include a
state as a party, commercial proceedings are private in nature and therefore do not give rise to
Article II concerns. See U.S. CONST. art. II; RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 55; see also Inter-
American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 5, Jan. 30, 1975, O.A.S.T.S.
No. 42, 14 I.L.M. 336 (1975) [hereinafter Panama Convention]; United Nations Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter New York Convention]; BORN, supra note 14, at 91-105; EMMANUEL GAILLARD &
JOHN SAVAGE, FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION 190-92, 247-300 (1999) [hereinafter FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN].
49 See Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports Exec. Comm. v. United States, 471 F.3d 1329 (D.C.
Cir. 2006); RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 55-57, 63. This matter continues to be very active. See,
e.g., John R. Crook, United States, Canada Arbitrate Softwood Lumber Disputes at London
Court of International Arbitration; Canada Prevails in Most Recent Case, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 869,
869-72 (2012).
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scholars working on the constitutionality of NAFTA arbitration.o
Indeed, there is a significant amount of literature concerning the
constitutional implications of NAFTA arbitration, although Rut-
ledge only mentions a few of these authorities in passing."
In many ways, the approach to existing scholarship is surpris-
ing, given the caliber of the authors who have been overlooked.5 2
However, Rutledge appears to bypass conventional commentary so
as to develop more novel arguments by analogy. This kind of
cross-disciplinary analysis is both innovative and informative, pro-
viding a kind of broad lateral thinking that is welcome (and indeed
necessary) in this field. Of course, some examples work better
than others,5  but the approach is nevertheless refreshing. Ulti-
mately, Rutledge concludes that "because the mechanism for ap-
pointing arbitrators to binational panels does not aggrandize a
50 See U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2; see e.g., Richard Albert, The Cult of Constitutionalism, 39
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 373, 375 (2012); Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 303,
317 (2007); Jean Galbraith, Prospective Advice and Consent, 37 YALE J. INT'L L. 247 (2012);
John Yoo, Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International
Bargaining, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2011).
51 Rutledge relies primarily on a number of articles arising out of a symposium conducted in
1992. See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 58, 60; Jim C. Chen, Appointments with Disaster: The
Unconstitutionality of Binational Arbitral Review under the United-States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1455 (1992); William J. Davey, The Appointments Clause
and International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: A False Conflict, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1315, 1316-17 (1992); Alan B. Morrison, Appointments Clause Problems in the Dispute Resolu-
tion Provisions of the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1299 (1992). However, there appears to be a wealth of more recent commentary that might be
equally or perhaps even more appropriate to discuss. See Albert, supra note 50, at 375; Dorf,
supra note 50, at 317; Galbraith, supra note 50, at 247; Yoo, supra note 50, at 7-8.
52 For example, it seems strange not to mention the work of Bruce Ackerman and Laurence
Tribe, particularly since Ackerman's and Tribe's analyses are more recent than most of the arti-
cles cited in the book. See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 58, 60; Bruce Ackerman & David
Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking
Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation,
108 HARV. L. REv. 1221, 1266-67 & n.156 (1995).
53 For example, in discussing whether the use of arbitration in NAFTA disputes violates the
Appointment Clause, Rutledge notes, without more, that critics of the process "point to the
Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo." RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 60; see also 424
U.S. 1, 126 (1976). Unfortunately, these critics are never named and no citation is given for this
proposition, nor is the decision in Buckley discussed. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126. Farther
down the page, in the discussion of the NAFTA defenders' position, Rutledge cites to one
(rather dated) work, but it is unclear whether that article also covers issues from the critics'
perspective. See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 60; see also Homer E. Moyer, Chapter 19 of the
NAFTA: Binational Panels at the Trade Courts of Last Resort, 27 INT'L L. 707, 711-12 (1993).
This ambiguity is somewhat frustrating to the reader and suggests that the book could be im-
proved by a more consistent and comprehensive approach to citation of authorities.
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coordinate branch of government, it does not run afoul of the Ap-
pointments Clause."54
Rutledge also discusses the constitutionality of NAFTA arbi-
tration under the Take Care Clause, which requires the president
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 5  Rutledge
again introduces somewhat disparate case law, including a decision
regarding background checks on handgun purchases.5 6 While this
discussion is intriguing, it is based on unsupported references to
"NAFTA's opponents," who are said to have made the initial anal-
ogy to the handgun case.57  This kind of veiled references to un-
named authorities can become problematic, since it suggests an on-
going debate to which the reader is not privy. 8 Furthermore, the
lack of information about cases and commentators referred to in
the text thwarts the reader's ability to evaluate the strength of the
relative positions taken by other authors and the merits of Rut-
ledge's own proposals and analyses. 59 However, the fact that the
reader wants to know more about these issues is to Rutledge's
credit and demonstrates the importance and timeliness of the sub-
ject matter.
The last part of Chapter 2 considers whether the Appoint-
ments Clause and the Take Care Clause carry any implications for
private (i.e., non-treaty-based) arbitration involving the United
States.6 0 This analysis requires detailed consideration of whether
and to what extent the U.S. government can enter into binding ar-
bitration, an often-ignored issue that Rutledge handles well.6 1
54 RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 63.
55 U.S. CONST. art. II, §3; see also RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 64.
56 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 65.
57 RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 65; see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 898.
58 Problems with supporting authorities are seen elsewhere in this chapter. See RUTLEDGE,
supra note 4, at 60; see also supra note 53.
59 For example, Rutledge runs through three other Supreme Court decision in short order.
See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 68-69; see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211 (1995);
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952) (the "Steel Seizure" case); see also supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
60 See U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2; id. §3; RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 70.
61 See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993, 2994
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (2007)); Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-320, 110 Stat. 3870 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-83 (2008)); Administrative Dispute Res-
olution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-
83 (2008)); see also Order by Janet Reno, Attorney General, Promoting the Broader Appropriate
Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques (Apr. 6, 1995), available at http://www.adr.gov/
pdf/reno.pdf; Memo from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, to John Schmidt, Asso-
ciate Attorney General, Constitutional Issues in Federal Arbitration 13 (Sept. 7, 1995); INTER-
AGENCY ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION WORKING GROUP, http://www.adr.gov/about-adr.
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Though short, this section is extremely interesting and carries po-
tentially far-reaching implications for both domestic and interna-
tional arbitration. 6 2
C. Federalism
The second section in Arbitration and the Constitution is much
stronger than the first, likely because the author can draw on the
work of a large number of courts and commentators before provid-
ing his own unique insights. The focus here is on federalism, with
Chapter 3 taking on the thorny question of federal preemption of
state law under the Supremacy Clause.6 3 The discussion distin-
guishes between the enforcement of arbitration agreements, arbi-
tral procedure and the enforcement of arbitral awards, thereby
breaking down the proceedings sequentially and considering issues
that arise at the beginning of the arbitration, during the pendency
of the arbitration and after the arbitration has ended.6 4
Federal preemption of state arbitration law is a subject that
has been well canvassed by both courts and commentators,6 5 which
html; RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 71; STRONG, ADR, supra note 13; Lisa Blomgren Bingham et
al., Dispute Resolution and the Vanishing Trial: Comparing Federal Government Litigation and
ADR Outcomes, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 225, 229-33 (2009); Jeffrey M. Senger, Turning
the Ship of State, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 79, 95 (2000). Rutledge does well here by introducing
several authorities and issues that are not commonly considered by commentators. See RUT-
LEDGE, supra note 4, at 70-74.
62 See infra notes 219-35 and accompanying text. The issue of whether a state may subject
itself to private arbitration is under debate in a number of countries around the world. See
JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 127-5
to 27-15, 27-35 to 27-83 (2003); Strong, Colombia, supra note 5, at 75-79.
63 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 79. Interestingly, some com-
mentators have framed federal preemption as "subconstitutional" or as reflecting a "second or-
der constitutionalism." Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization,
53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1356 & n. 7 (2006). Although Rutledge does not discuss this issue
directly in Chapter 3, he does note in the conclusion that future research should consider the way
"constitutional influence varies with the issue," which could encompass inquiries of this nature.
RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 206; see also infra notes 167-78 and accompanying text.
64 RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 81-99.
65 As Rutledge correctly notes, there is a "serious academic debate" on this subject. Id. at
86; see, e.g., Edward P. Boyle & David N. Cinotti, Beyond Nondiscrimination: AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion and the Further Federalization of U.S. Arbitration Law, 12 PEPP. Disp.
RESOL. L.J. 373, 375-96 (2012) (concerning class arbitration); Christopher R. Drahozal, The
New York Convention and the American Federal System, 2012 J. DIsP. RESOL. 101, 107-14 (con-
cerning international arbitration); Michael J. Yelnovsky, Fully Federalizing the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, 90 OR. L. REV. 729, 751-70 (2012) (concerning class arbitration); Maureen A. Weston,
The Other Avenues of Hall Street and Prospects for Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 14
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allows Rutledge to consider a number of well-known Supreme
Court precedents, including, most prominently, Southland Corp. v.
Keating6 6 and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.6 7 However,
Rutledge goes beyond standard analyses and proposes a new para-
digm that "consider[s] the effort by the Court to reallocate hori-
zontal separation of powers at the state level." 68  This model
suggests that although the current approach to arbitration agree-
ments "purports to preserve room for federal principles" by indi-
cating that "generally applicable state-law contract defenses govern
the FAA [Federal Arbitration Act]," the decisions actually exhibit
a different, and inherently anti-federalist, perspective to the extent
that they "expand the power of state courts" while simultaneously
"limit[ing] the tools available to state legislatures."6 9
Rutledge believes that this new approach is reflected in the
Supreme Court's 2011 decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep-
cion, which he frames as indicating that "the mere fact that an anti-
arbitration rule falls within a generally applicable state contract
doctrine supplies merely a necessary - but no longer sufficient -
condition for that rule to survive Section 2 preemption. Instead,
the rule must undergo a second level of federal review." 0 If true,
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 929, 943-49 (2010) (concerning expanded judicial review). Although
the book cites one article that may include numerous references to recent work in this field, see
Hiro Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1189 (2011), the discussion
also inexplicably refers to a much older article as providing a "good summary of the scholarship
on this issue," RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 87 n.23 (citing Kevin Teeven, A History of Legislative
Reform of the Common Law of Contract, 26 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 35 (1994)). Though the Teeven
article may be useful, it would be preferable if more and more recent authorities were provided
so that readers could conduct additional research and further understand the basis for Rut-
ledge's various assertions.
66 465 U.S. 1 (1984); see RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 83-86.
67 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); see RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 91-92; Other decisions discussed in
the text include Doctors Associates v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996), Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S.
483 (1987), Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1
(1983), and Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). See
RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 83-86. Case law concerning federal preemption continues to de-
velop, and two cases accepted by the Supreme Court for review after Arbitration and the Consti-
tution went to press may address preemption issues, either directly or indirectly. See Am.
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter,
133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013); see also S.I. STRONG, CLASS, MASS AND COLLECrIVE ARBITRATION IN
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 11.23-1.24, 4.77, 4.106 (2013) [hereinafter STRONG,
CLASS].
68 RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 87.
69 Id. at 86-87; see also 9 U.S.C. §§1-16 (2012).
70 RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 92; see also AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1740.
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this would indeed signal an increased role for federal law in U.S.
arbitrations. 7
The next subject addressed in the book involves federalism
and arbitral procedure. 72 Interestingly, Rutledge believes the Su-
preme Court has exhibited a "comparatively greater tolerance of
federalism principles in the context of arbitration procedures" than
with respect to enforcement of arbitration agreements.7 3 This "tol-
erance," which "can be understood as an effort ... to support arbi-
tration as an institution,"7  arises as a result of various gaps in the
FAA, which create "the conditions for state law to play a role in
arbitral procedures."7 5
The final section in Chapter 3 considers the enforcement of
arbitral awards. Here, Rutledge believes that U.S. law "displays a
solicitude for federalism similar to that shown in the context of ar-
71 AT&T Mobility is seen by many observers as a departure from previous precedent and
has generated a significant amount of commentary. See AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1740;
RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 86-87; see also STRONG, CLASS, supra note 67, 4.77-4.121; Gary
Born & Claudio Salas, The United States Supreme Court and Class Arbitration: A Tragedy of
Errors, 2012 J. Dtsp. RESOL. 21, 31 (2012); Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggre-
gate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012);
David Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 387 (2012) [hereinafter Horton,
Unconscionability]; Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract: The New Tril-
ogy, 22 AM. REV. INT'L L. 435 (2011); Judith Resnik, Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Com-
ment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78,
148-50 (2011); George Rutherglen, Wal-Mart, AT&T Mobility, and the Decline of the Deterrent
Class Action, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 24, 28 (2012); David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing
Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239 (2012); Suzana Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered at the
Supreme Court, 2011 Sup. CT. REV. 1 (2011); Craig Smith & Eric V. Moyd, Outsourcing Ameri-
can Civil Justice: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Employment Contracts, 44
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 281 (2012); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Tainted Love: An Increasingly Odd Arbitral
Infatuation in Derogation of Sound and Consistent Jurisprudence, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 795
(2012); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to
Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703 (2012) [hereinafter Sternlight, Tsunami]; Thomas J. Stipanowich, The
Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the Future of Ameri-
can Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 323 (2011); Strong, First Principles, supra note 15, at
201; S.I. Strong, Resolving Mass Legal Disputes Through Class Arbitration: The United States and
Canada Compared, 37 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 921 (2012) [hereinafter Strong, Canada];
Ann Marie Tracey & Shelley McGill, Seeking a Rational Lawyer for Consumer Claims After the
Supreme Court Disconnects Consumers in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 45 Lov. L.A. L.
REV. 435 (2012); Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 U.
KAN. L. REV. 767 (2012).
72 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 93-97.
73 Id. at 96. The sentence quoted refers to "arbitration awards," but the rest of the para-
graph discusses arbitration agreements, suggesting the author simply misspoke in that one line.
The introduction to the next subsection also suggests Rutledge meant to say "arbitration agree-
ments" in the sentence quoted. See id. at 97.
74 Id at 97.
75 Id. at 94.
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bitral procedure," since "the law here ... leaves space for states
that adopt anti-arbitration positions (. . . with limited excep-
tions)."7 6 Although this analysis adequately covers the various
statutory issues, it unfortunately does not engage with the signifi-
cant number of judicial decisions relating to domestic and interna-
tional enforcement of arbitral awards." As a result, the discussion
is disappointingly short and does not demonstrate the kind of in-
sight exhibited by the author elsewhere in the chapter.
Indeed, some of the Chapter 3 analysis is deeply innovative.
For example, at one point the text introduces the concept of "a 'law
market' for different arbitral procedures," noting that "diversity
can actually benefit arbitration, for it encourages parties to site
their disputes in jurisdictions whose mix of procedural devices best
serves the parties' interests.""7 This idea, which involves a sophisti-
cated law-and-economics approach to arbitration that is developed
more robustly in Rutledge's other writings, could be usefully ap-
plied to enforcement procedures in international commercial arbi-
tration, since parties in those situations are often faced with a wide
range of possible venues for enforcement of an award.7 9 However,
Rutledge devotes only a paragraph to international enforcement
issues in his section on awards, thereby missing an opportunity to
demonstrate the usefulness of this "law market" methodology.80
The second chapter in this section, Chapter 4, considers arbi-
tration and the choice of law, focusing on whether "parties can
(and should be able to) contract around" certain rules regarding
the preeminence of federal law. 1 Questions relating to the proper
limits of party autonomy in arbitration have become increasingly
urgent in recent years,82 although choice of law concerns have not
76 Id. at 97.
77 Id. at 97-99.
78 RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 96-97.
79 See Rutledge, Convergence, supra note 22, at 52-61; see also STRONG, GUIDE, supra note
13, at 63-87; S.I. Strong, Border Skirmishes: The Intersection Between Litigation and Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration, 2012 J. DisP. RESOL. 1, 14-16 [hereinfter Strong, Borders].
80 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 99.
81 See id. at 101.
82 Much of the impetus comes from the Supreme Court's suggestion in AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion that parties can avoid certain procedural devices (in that case, class action mecha-
nisms) through private contractual means. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
1740, 1753 (2011). A considerable amount of commentary has been generated on this issue. See
STRONG, CLASS, supra note 67, 114.85-4.121, 5.51-57; Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2077 n.124 (2012); William H. Baker, Class
Action Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLIcT RESOL. 335, 360-66 (2009); Joseph Blochner,
Rights To and Not To, 100 CAL. L. REV. 761, 802-11 (2012); Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking:
Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1362-67 (2012); Kevin E.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONUNDRUMS
received as much attention as waivers of class proceedings." Nev-
ertheless, this area of law will likely come under increasing fire as
parties become more creative in their litigation tactics, and
Supremacy Clause concerns could be among the issues raised.84
When considering the scope and effects of procedural auton-
omy in arbitration, the book distinguishes between three related
questions: choice of law in the arbitration agreement, choice of
forum for the hearing on the merits and choice of forum for any
procedural challenges. The primary analytical framework is con-
tractual in nature, in that it characterizes some legal principles in
arbitration as akin to mandatory rules of law and others as compa-
rable to default rules."
The discussion about choice of law in arbitration agreements
focuses on three core cases from the arbitral canon: Volt Informa-
tion Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
University," Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,88 and
Preston v. Ferrer.8 9 Rutledge parses through the various decisions
and ultimately concludes that these cases illustrate the Supreme
Court's view of arbitration as shifting "from a 'default' system to
an increasingly 'mandatory' one . . . without much systematic ex-
amination or input from the political branches." 90 Though the dis-
Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 520-64
(2011); Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Private Procedural Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 776-83
(2011J; Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 22, at 1165-68; Patrick A. Luff, Bad Bargains: The
Mistake of Allowing Cost-Benefit Analyses in Class Action Certification Decisions, 41 U. MEM-
PHIs L. REV. 65, 74 n.36 (2010); Sternlight, Tsunami, supra note 71, at 717-27; Strong, Canada,
supra note 71, at 965-71; S.I. Strong, Regulatory Litigation in the European Union: Does the U.S.
Class Action Have a New Analogue? 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 899, 943-45 (2012).
83 Some intriguing works nevertheless exist. See Thomas A. Diamond, Choice of Law
Clauses and Their Preemptive Effect upon the Federal Arbitration Act: Reconciling the Supreme
Court with Itself, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 35, 35 (1997); Dodge, supra note 82, at 723; Zhaodong Jiang,
Federal Arbitration Right, Choice-of-Law Clauses and State Rules and Procedure, 22 Sw. U. L.
REV. 159, 178-235 (1992); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settle-
ment Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1921 (2006);
Ashley M. Wheelock, Comment, An Issue of Enforcement: Foreign Arbitration and Choice-of-
Law Clause Within a Jones Act Seaman's Employment Contract, 37 TUL. MAR. L.J. 285, 298-317
(2012).
84 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
85 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 104.
86 See id. at 104-06. This approach is consistent with the maxim that arbitration is a "crea-
ture of contract." Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for
Workable Solutions, 72 IOWA L. REV. 473, 476 (1987).
87 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
88 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
89 552 U.S. 346 (2008).
90 RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 113.
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cussion could be expanded to reflect some of the commentary in
this field, Rutledge's analysis is well in line with standard interpre-
tation of the case law.91
Next, the book considers "[t]he law governing arbitration pro-
ceedings[, which] has followed a very different course from the
Volt-Preston line" of cases.9 2 The issue here involves "choices
about forums, whether arbitral or judicial," 9 3 and the extent to
which "the choice of forum influence[s] the arbitrator's resort to
the forum state's arbitral law."9 4
The analysis relies primarily on Green Tree Financial Corp. v.
Bazzle95 and focuses on the way in which that decision "acknowl-
edged that one of the main goals of the arbitrators was to render an
enforceable award under South Carolina law with respect to the
permissibility of multi-party arbitration." 9 6 According to Rutledge,
"the arbitrators' decision to follow the state court's reasoning" in a
preliminary proceeding "indicated that an arbitrator wanted to
construe state law in the same manner as the state courts in order
to secure an enforceable arbitral award," thereby underscoring the
importance of state law in the choice of forum analysis. 9 7 How-
ever, Rutledge admits that the arbitrator's approach did not consti-
tute "a persuasive argument on appeal in Bazzle itself," which
could be seen as undercutting Rutledge's conclusions about the im-
portance of state law in determinations relating to the choice of
forum. 98 Unfortunately, the text does not provide further insights
into how Bazzle affects the importance of state law in this field.99
Chapter 4 concludes with an analysis of the way in which fed-
eralism and personal autonomy interact with the enforcement of
arbitral awards. The core decision in this discussion is Hall Street
Associates, L.L. C. v. Mattel, Inc., which addressed parties' ability
91 See, e.g., Philip J. Loree Jr., Stolt-Nielsen Delivers a New FAA Rule - And Then Federal-
izes the Law of Contracts, 28 ALT. HIGH COST LIr. 121 (June 2010); Margaret L. Moses, Statu-
tory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted
by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99 (2006).
92 RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 113.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 115.
95 539 U.S. 444, 453 (2003) (Breyer, J.).
96 RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 115.
97 Id. at 115-16. In Bazzle, the South Carolina state court had ruled on a preliminary issue
regarding the propriety of class arbitration in one of the joined cases, and the arbitrator had
followed that determination. See Bazzle, 530 U.S. at 453 (Breyer, J.); see also RUTLEDGE, Supra
note 4, at 115.
98 RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 116; see also Bazzle, 530 U.S. at 453 (Breyer, J.).
99 RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 115-16; see also Bazzle, 530 U.S. at 453 (Breyer, J.).
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to expand judicial review of arbitral awards through contractual
measures.' 0 According to Rutledge, the issue here involves "regu-
latory concerns about the investment of judicial resources,"'o with
federal courts coming to a different conclusion about the appropri-
ate balance than various state courts and legislatures. 1 0 2
The disparity between state and federal treatment of enforce-
ment issues allows Rutledge to engage in a brief discussion of the
benefits of diversity that can arise from robust protection of feder-
alist values.103 Thus, the book asks whether these differences con-
stitute a
salutary development[.] For one thing, from the perspective of
federalism values, the answer would seem to be an unequivocal
yes. It enables parties, through their affirmative choice, to give
effect to state regulatory decisions designed to give even greater
effect than the federal standard. To be sure, the greater diver-
sity of state practice - and the variation from federal practice -
tolerated by these rules dampens the uniformity goals that
animated decisions such as Southland. Yet perhaps this is a sen-
sible price - at least in cases where the federalism values are
wedded with freedom-of-contract values (that is, giving effect to
the parties' choices about the scope of judicial review of the
award).104
The discussion goes on to consider these issues from a law-
and-economics perspective, a technique that Rutledge uses to ad-
vantage elsewhere. 0 Regardless of whether one ultimately agrees
with the conclusions outlined in the book, the methodological ap-
proach provides an intriguing and sophisticated means of analyzing
judicial decisions concerning the enforcement of arbitral awards.
D. Individual Liberties
The third and final section of Arbitration and the Constitution
moves away from questions of institutional design and into the
100 See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008).
101 RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 117.
102 See Hall St., 552 U.S. at 590; N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A: 23B-4(c) (West 2003); Nafta Traders,
Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 101 (Tex. 2011); Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190
P.3d 586, 598-99 (Cal. 2008); RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 120-21.
103 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 121-22.
104 Id. at 121; see also Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
105 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 122; see also Rutledge, Convergence, supra note 22, at
52-61.
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realm of individual rights, beginning in Chapter 5 with a discussion
of state action and the Due Process Clauses.106 In considering
whether and to what extent arbitration constitutes state action, the
text engages with the work of commentators such as Sarah Cole,
Richard Reuben and Jean Sternlighto'0 7 while also addressing a di-
verse array of judicial authorities, including decisions (such as Gil-
mer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.10) that lie at the heart of
modern arbitration law as well as opinions (such as Shelley v.
Kramer'0 9) that exist outside the arbitral mainstream.110 The dis-
cussion incorporates certain ideas (such as concerns about judicial
ouster) that were addressed earlier in the book"' while also intro-
ducing entirely new concepts. In so doing, the text confidently
walks the line between generalist and specialist audiences, provid-
ing an analysis that is both nuanced and appropriately aimed at
readers who may only have a passing knowledge of one or the
other of the two areas of law.
Rutledge concludes, consistent with other authorities, that ar-
bitration does not constitute state action, which eliminates any for-
mal need for arbitration to adopt principles of procedural due
process.' 12 However, Rutledge also believes that, "as with other
topics analyzed throughout this book, constitutional principles
have seeped into arbitration through other mechanisms."1 1 3 In this
case, Rutledge believes that constitutional concepts of procedural
fairness have entered into the arbitral realm by virtue of various
voluntary due process protocols.' 1 4
The book does not spend a great deal of time outlining the
content of the individual protocols and focuses instead on the rea-
sons why the arbitral and business communities developed these
106 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 127.
107 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 129-44; Cole, supra note 5; Reuben, supra note 5; Ster-
nlight, Constitutionality, supra note 5.
108 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
109 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
110 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 129-44.
111 See id. at 133; see also supra notes 30-46 and accompanying text.
112 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 145. The one exception to this general proviso is court-
annexed arbitration, which Rutledge believes does in fact constitute state action. See id. at 131;
see also Amy J. Schmitz, Nonconsensual + Nonbinding = Nonsensical?, 10 CARDOZO J. CON-
FLIcT RESOL. 587, 603-06 (2009) (discussing constitutional challenges to court-annexed
arbitration).
113 RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 145.
114 See id. at 145-56.
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particular devices. 1 s This discussion is quite extensive and consid-
ers the evolution of the protocols from a sociological, economic
and political perspective.1 6 While the economic analysis is easily
the most sophisticated, the breadth of the discussion is quite useful
in rounding out the reader's understanding of the various forces at
work.11 7
The book then goes on to evaluate other ways that due process
principles "have seeped into arbitration.""18 For example, Rut-
ledge considers how various due process principles are reflected in
judicial interpretations of the leading treaty on international en-
forcement of arbitration agreements and awards in commercial dis-
putes (the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, more commonly known
as the New York Convention).119 While the discussion is interest-
ing and the emphasis on international dispute resolution welcome,
it is unclear why the book focuses solely on international matters,
since domestic arbitrations far outnumber international proceed-
ings.12 0 Furthermore, the New York Convention is meant to be in-
terpreted pursuant to international, rather than domestic
115 Although some additional detail about the content of the protocols would be welcome, the
level of generality is sufficient to Rutledge's primary point, which is that these protocols exist
and have been developed as a means of addressing certain perceived problems with the fairness
of arbitral procedures. See id. at 148. Those who wish to consider the various protocols them-
selves will find a wealth of information readily available. See, e.g., AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION, RULES AND PROCEDURES, www.adr.org (reproducing a number of due process
protocols); Bone, supra note 82, at 1366 n.155; Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz,
Private Regulation of Consumer Arbitration, 79 TENN. L. REV. 289, 300-52 (2012); Erin O'Hara
O'Connor et al., Customizing Employment Arbitration, 98 IoWA L. REV. 133, 151-52 (2012);
Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index: Using a Public Rating System to Skirt
the Legal Logjam and Promote Fairer and More Effective Arbitration of Employment and Con-
sumer Disputes, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 985, 998-1001, 1011-20 (2012).
116 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 150-56.
117 See id.
118 Id. at 156.
119 See New York Convention, supra note 48; RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 156-59. The New
York Convention is one of the most successful commercial treaties in history, with over 145
states parties. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Sta-
tus: 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/NYConvention_ status.html (last visited
Jan. 3, 2013); see also BORN, supra note 14, at 91-105; FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra
note 48, 1190-92, 247-300.
120 Compare BORN, supra note 14, at 69, 162 (citing number of annual filings at various inter-
national arbitral institutions) with Theodore J. St. Antoine, ADR in Labor and Employment
Law During the Past Quarter Century, 25 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 411, 442-43 (2010) (suggesting
there were approximately 25,000 labor arbitration awards in 2008); see also Richard C. Reuben,
Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1103, 1128 (2009)
(estimating the number of domestic arbitrations "at least in the hundreds of thousands").
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standards, which could create some analytical difficulties to the ex-
tent that Rutledge is focusing on the incorporation of domestic
constitutional principles into arbitral law and procedure.12 1
Confusion also exists regarding Rutledge's third example of
the increasing influence of constitutional due process in arbitra-
tion.1 22 Here, Rutledge focuses on treaty design issues, particularly
in the context of the work of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) on transparency in inter-
national investment arbitration.12 3 Although these developments
may indeed reflect the incorporation of due process concerns in
arbitration, it is not clear that these principles are based on the
U.S. Constitution rather than some other source.12 4 Indeed, com-
mentators typically do not tie due process in international arbitra-
tion to any particular constitutional norm. Instead, the concept of
due process in international arbitration "refers to a number of no-
tions with varying names under different national laws, including
natural justice, procedural fairness, the right or opportunity to be
heard, the so-called principle de la contradiction and equal treat-
ment." 2s "In many national laws this core is described as ordre
public or public policy," which may or may not be constitutional in
nature.126
121 See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, ICCA's GUIDE TO THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE 1958 NEW YORK CONVENTION 12 (2011) [hereinafter ICCA GUIDE];
ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDI-
CIAL INTERPRETATION 3-5 (1981); see also S.I. Strong, Enforcing Class Arbitration in the Inter-
national Sphere: Due Process and Public Policy Concerns, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1, 29 (2008).
While it may be that Rutledge is relying on the fact that the U.S. Constitution is considered
superior to treaties, even those of a self-executing nature, Rutledge's analysis regarding the in-
corporation of principles of U.S. constitutional law in judicial procedures falling under the New
York Convention is somewhat unclear. See New York Convention, supra note 48; Reid v. Cov-
ert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957) (noting the superiority of the U.S. Constitution over treaties); Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §111 cmt. a (1987); Vasan Kesavan, Three Tiers of
Federal Law, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1479, 1480 (2006); Strong, Constitutional, supra note 5.
122 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 159-61.
123 See id.; see also UNCITRAL, Working Group II: 2000 to Present: Arbitration and Con-
ciliation, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitrallen/commission/working-groups/2Arbitration.html (last
visited July 21, 2013) (listing various working group papers on transparency).
124 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
125 Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 14, 1321-22 (citations omitted). This principle "is often
understood as a 'hard' rule of law, a kind of a core or foundation of all other procedural rules,
the violation or disregard of which will lead to unenforceability of the award or decision given."
MATTI S. KURKELA & HANNES SNELLMAN, DUE PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 1 (2005).
126 KURKELA & SNELLMAN, supra note 125, at 4; see also Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the
Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1203
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Furthermore, the minimum due process requirements in arbi-
tration are relatively straightforward when compared to standards
reflected in most national legal orders and simply indicate "that
parties be provided with (1) reasonable notice and (2) an opportu-
nity to be heard." 1 2 7 While these principles have been said to form
a "so-called due process defense [that] has been interpreted to 'es-
sentially sanction[ ] the application of the forum state's standards
of due process,"' the "forum" in question is typically the seat of
arbitration, which may be located somewhere other than where the
judicial proceeding in question is taking place.12 8 Therefore, while
Rutledge's hypothesis about the incorporation of U.S. constitu-
tional principles may be correct in some cases (i.e., in situations
where the arbitration is seated in the United States), it is less clear
that U.S. due process concerns are or should be relevant to judicial
proceedings relating to arbitrations seated elsewhere.12 9 This is
particularly true in the context of investment arbitration, which is
typically governed almost entirely by international (rather than na-
tional) principles of substantive and procedural law. 1 3 0
The book concludes in Chapter 6 with a discussion of the way
in which the constitutional right to trial by jury is affected by arbi-
tration.1 3 1 Although the analysis is expanded to include issues aris-
ing under both state and federal law,13 2 the text nevertheless
recognizes that this particular debate is virtually unique to the
(2009) (discussing subconstitutional nature of certain public policies); Stephen M. Schwebel &
Susan G. Lahne, Public Policy and Arbitral Procedure, in COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRAC-
TICE AND PUBLIC POLICY 205, 209 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1986) (discussing public policy's constitu-
ent elements); James Y. Stern, Note, Choice of Law, the Constitution, and Lochner, 94 VA. L.
REV. 1509, 1524 (2008) (noting public policy exceptions to enforcement of foreign judgments
have at times been framed as subconstitutional in nature).
127 Weston, Universes, supra note 5, at 1770.
128 Osamu Inoue, Note & Comment, The Due Process Defense to Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards in United States Federal Courts: A Proposal for a Standard, 11
AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 247, 247 (2000) (citation omitted); see also Judith O'Hare, The Denial of
Due Process and the Enforceability of CIETAC Awards Under the New York Convention - the
Hong Kong Experience, 13 J. INT'L ARB. 179, 184 (1996). International commercial arbitration
can involve judicial actions in a variety of locations. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 13, at
33-36 (discussing primary and secondary jurisdiction); Strong, Borders, supra note 79, at 13-16
(noting times when the international arbitral regime contemplates potential judicial actions in
different jurisdictions).
129 See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 13, at 33-36; see also infra note 202 and accompanying
text.
130 See CAMPBELL McLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUB-
STANTIVE PRINCIPLES 13.79, 7.30 (2007).
131 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 170; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
132 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 171 n. 5 (listing various state constitutional provisions).
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United States, since few other countries provide for civil trial by
jury.133
In this section, Rutledge focuses on a series of related ques-
tions, including first, whether the jury right is waivable; second,
whether the right (if waivable) can be disposed of on a pre-dispute
basis; and third, whether the right (if waivable on a pre-dispute
basis) has in fact been waived by the language adopted by the par-
ties.1 3 4 Although "[m]ost debates among scholars and in judicial
decisions concern the third issue," Rutledge fortunately does not
limit himself in that manner.13 5  Instead, he undertakes a more
wide-ranging analysis that provides useful insights that are relevant
not only to parties' ability to waive a jury trial, but also to their
ability to waive other sorts of procedural rights.136
The discussion begins by considering whether the right to a
jury trial is private (i.e., individual) or public in nature.1'3  Al-
though the various arguments are relatively well-known13 8 and the
outcome something of a foregone conclusion, 3 9 the analysis is nev-
ertheless helpful, since it demonstrates the types of issues that may
arise in other contexts, such as those involving waivers of class and
collective relief.14 0
This section also includes several innovative observations. For
example, the text notes that, "[a]s a matter of state constitutional
law, . . . alienation of the parties' jury right might be ... unenforce-
able even in the non-arbitral context."141 Because "the FAA does
not preempt generally applicable state constitutional guarantees
that, as a matter of state law, are not alienable," waivers that are
valid as a matter of federal law may be invalid as a matter of state
133 See id. at 173-74.
134 See id. at 172-73.
135 Id. at 173.
136 The issue of waiver is becoming increasingly important in arbitration. See supra note 84
and accompanying text.
137 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 175.
138 See id.; see also KATHERINE V.w. STONE & RICHARD A. BALES, ARBITRATION LAw 382
(2010) (citing various articles by Jean Sternlight and Stephen Ware debating waivers of Seventh
Amendment jury rights through arbitration); Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The
Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 494 (2007); Peristadt,
supra note 5, at 208; Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. Disp. RESOL. 181, 183-91.
139 Although Rutledge spends a significant amount of time discussing whether and to what
extent the right to a jury should be alienable, he admits that courts and commentators have
universally concluded that such rights are waivable. See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 177-84.
140 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. Class waivers were recently addressed by U.S.
Supreme Court, after having been initially addressed in 2011. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
141 RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 182.
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law. 14 2 As Rutledge notes, this is an important point given the cur-
rent debate regarding the enforceability of class waivers in
arbitration.' 4 3
Indeed, class arbitration provides a useful illustration of the
potential for different outcomes under state and federal law. For
example, most federal courtsl 4 4 appear to take the view that waiv-
ers of the collective action provisions of the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) can be upheld. 1 45 However, this approach
can be contrasted with the treatment of claims arising under Cali-
fornia's Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA),1 4 6 which
was created as "a means of 'deputizing' citizens as private attor-
neys general to enforce the Labor Code," and, as such, provides
relief "for the benefit of the general public rather than the party
142 Id.
143 See id. at 183-84; STRONG, CLASS, supra note 67, 4.85-4.121, 5.51-5.57; see also AT&T
Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1740; Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2304. At
this point, it is unclear whether and to what extent the ability to proceed as a class should be
considered procedural or substantive, and whether that ability should be considered a right or a
remedy. See STRONG, CLASS, supra note 67, $14.1-08, 5.70-80; Strong, Canada, supra note 71,
at 972-75. While such issues are beyond the scope of the current discussion, it is important to
note that although some procedural rights can be considered "subconstitutional," they are often
necessary to support constitutional principles of fairness in adjudication. See Judith Resnik,
Constitutional Entitlements to and in Courts: Remedial Rights in an Age of Egalitarianism, 56 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 917, 966 (2012) (discussing "the development of a host of sub-constitutional dis-
covery rights in both civil and criminal cases" to ensure "the legitimacy of civil judgments"); see
also Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for "Trial by Formula," 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 607 (2012)
(suggesting "there is a basis in the existing doctrine and the language of the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses for establishing a right to outcome equality in adjudication" and that
"[tjhat right has even been recognized by the Supreme Court"). As such, the right to proceed as
a class could be characterized as falling within the right to an effective remedy, which is pro-
tected as a type of fundamental or core constitutional right in some jurisdictions. See S.I. Strong,
Cross-Border Collective Redress and Individual Participatory Rights: Quo Vadis?, 32 Civ. JUST.
Q. _ (forthcoming 2013); S.I. Strong, Cross-Border Collective Redress in the European Union:
Constitutional Rights in the Face of the Brussels I Regulation, 45 ARIz. ST. L. J. 233 (2013).
144 A significant number of courts disagree on the grounds that individual waivers of collec-
tive provisions are unenforceable because the right to proceed collectively is not individual in
nature. See Raniere v. Citigroup Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 294, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also
STRONG, CLAss, supra note 67, 4.97-4.100.
145 See 29 U.S.C. §216(b) (2012); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 707 F.3d 1050, 1054 (8th Cir.
2013); Vilches v. The Travelers Cos., 413 Fed. App'x 487, 494 (3d Cir. 2011); Torres v. United
Healthcare Servs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 368 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); STRONG, CLASS, supra note 67,
114.97-4.100. Disputes based on the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA) may also result in
bilateral arbitration, despite provisions in TILA specifically allowing for class actions. See 15
U.S.C. 0§1601 et seq. (2012); THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §16:13 (2012);
Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class
Action Survive? 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 13-14, 63-65, 80-83 (2000) (discussing TILA
claims).
146 See CAL. LAB, CODE §§2698-2699.5 (2012); see id. §2699.
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bringing the action." 1 4 7  Numerous California state courts have
held that waivers of PAGA provisions reflecting the right to bring a
claim on behalf of "other current or former employees" are unen-
forceable, even in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, because that decision did not
address waivers of state laws that are intended to benefit the
public. 148
This phenomenon would, perhaps, be sufficient to prove Rut-
ledge's point about the different treatment of waiver analyses
under state and federal law, but further analytical complexities
arise as a result of federal court treatment of PAGA claims. 4 9 In
terestingly, the majority of federal decisions, including Kilgore v.
KeyBank, National Association from the Ninth Circuit, depart
from California state precedent and hold that waivers of PAGA's
representative relief provisions are enforceable and that PAGA
claims may be arbitrated on an individual basis.o50 While this result
may seem to violate certain principles of federalism (and would
thus be interesting to contemplate in the context of Rutledge's
Chapter 4 analysis),'' the Ninth Circuit did suggest in Kilgore that
the California state approach to PAGA may remain viable in cases
where the underlying statutory claims rely on state, rather than
federal, law.152 These issues, which will doubtless be further devel-
147 Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 862-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1910 (2012). Claims proceeding under PAGA are distinguishable from claims
proceeding under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the claimant in a
PAG dispute is said to act "as the proxy or agent of state labor law enforcement agencies ... in a
proceeding that is designed to protect the public, not to benefit private parties." Id. at 861; see
also FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
148 CAL. LAB, CODE §2699; see also AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1740; Reyes v. Macy's,
Inc., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 832, 835-36 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); Brown, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 863; Franco
v. Athens Disposal Co., 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 539, 555-58 (Cal. App. Ct. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
1050 (2010).
149 See RTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 182.
150 See Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat'l Ass'n, 673 F.3d 947, 951 (9th Cir. 2012); Coleman v. Jenny
Craig, Inc., No. 11cv1301-MMA (DHB), 2012 WL 3140299, at *4 (S.D. Cal., May 15, 2012);
Morvant v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., No. 11-CV-05405 YGR, 2012 WL 1604851, at *12
(N.D. Cal. May 7, 2012); Grabowski v. C.H. Robinson Co., 817 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1180 (S.D. Cal.
2011); Quevedo v. Macy's, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1142 (C.D. Cal. 2011), reconsideration
denied, 2011 WL 6961598 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Valle v. Lowe's HIW, Inc., No. 11-1489 SC, 2011 WL
3667441, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011); STRONG, CLASs, supra note 67, 114.97-4.100. A few
federal district courts have adopted the California state court approach to waivers relating to
PAGA proceedings. See Plows v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1069 (C.D. Cal.
2011); Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of Cal., Inc., No. 2:11-cv-06456-CJC(PJwx), 2011 WL 4595249, at
*10-11 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2011).
151 See supra notes 81-105 and accompanying text.
152 See Kilgore, 673 F.3d at 962.
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oped in future judicial opinions, could benefit from analyses based
on Rutledge's distinction between the ability to waive a waive a
jury trial under federal versus state law.'5 3
The book then turns to the question of whether the right to a
jury may be waived prior to the onset of the dispute in question.
Here, Rutledge claims that
[t]he argument against pre-dispute waiver rests on the assump-
tion that, until the parties know the complete contours of a dis-
pute, they lack the necessary information to make a fully
informed choice whether to exercise, or waive, their right to a
jury trial. Pre-dispute arbitration clauses force parties to make a
decision about that important right before they have full (or at
least adequate) information the nature of their dispute.'54
Having framed the debate as an informational dilemma, Rut-
ledge then looks at other situations where procedural rights can be
waived without the benefit of full information about the ramifica-
tions of that decision.15 5 Drawing on fields as diverse as European
consumer law, rental car agreements and the Arbitration Fairness
Act allows Rutledge to evaluate the various policies at stake and
determine why the risk of impropriety is deemed to be too high in
some contexts but not in others.15 6 Although Rutledge recognizes
that pre-dispute arbitration agreements have long been considered
appropriate in the United States and that his analysis is not likely
to turn the tide of U.S. jurisprudence, the discussion usefully dem-
onstrates why parties are allowed to waive their right to a jury trial
before all the information about the dispute is available.'5 7
The third and final issue in this chapter involves the type of
language that is necessary to waive the right to a jury trial.' Al-
though questions relating to the sufficiency of jury waivers have
153 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 182.
154 Id. at 185.
155 See id. at 186-87.
156 See id. at 186; see also Directive 2005/29, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 11 May 2005 Concerning Unfair Business-to-Consumer Practices, 2005 O.J. (L 149) 22 (EC)
(Unfair Commercial Practices Directive); Directive 98/27, of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 19 May 1998 on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers' Interests, 1998 O.J.
(L 16) 51 (EC); Directive 93/13, of the Council of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29 (EEC); Commission Green Paper on Consumer Collective Re-
dress, COM (2008) 794 (Nov. 27, 2008); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong.
(2011); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011).
157 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 188-89.
158 See id. at 189.
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been addressed at length by numerous courts and commentators,159
Rutledge provides his own unique analytical twist by comparing
pre-dispute jury waivers to waivers of other types of procedural
rights.16 0 For example, he notes that criminal defendants are al-
lowed to waive certain important procedural rights (such as the
right to the assistance of counsel, certain Fourth Amendment rights
or the right to a Miranda warning), but only pursuant to various
safeguards ranging from a writing to a discussion with the judge in
open court.16 1 Alternatively, he notes that some types of transac-
tions require witnesses to confirm that the parties are capable of
undertaking certain duties or surrendering certain rights. 16 2
Rutledge considers each type of procedural protection to de-
termine whether it would be appropriate to impose a similar bur-
den on parties seeking to waive their right to a jury trial through
use of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. 1 6 3 After evaluating the
various transaction costs associated with each of the possible alter-
natives, he concludes that the best means of protecting the right to
a jury trial is to use a standardized model arbitration clause that
incorporates language that is deemed sufficient to put the parties
on notice of the rights that they are waiving.16 4 In many ways, this
approach is similar to the due process protocols discussed in Chap-
ter 5, since it relies on arbitral organizations
developing model clauses designed to ensure complete waiver of
the jury right, and courts supplying feedback on the adequacy or
inadequacy of those waivers (based upon the underlying policy
considerations identified . . . [in the text]). Over time, model
clauses might provide "safe harbor" language assured to pass
judicial muster, whereas more adventurous clauses risk closer
judicial examination and scrutiny. 65
159 See Christian N. Elloie, Are Pre-Dispute Jury Trial Waivers a Bargain for Employers Over
Arbitration? It Depends on the Employee, 76 DEF. COUNSEL J. 91, 91-108 (2009); Horton, Un-
conscionability, supra note 71, at 405; David F. Johnson, The Enforcement of Contractual Jury
Waiver Clauses in Texas, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 649, 669-74 (2010); Stephen A. Plass, Mandatory
Arbitration as an Employer's Contractual Prerogative: The Efficiency Challenge to Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity, 33 CARDOzo L. REV. 194, 223 (2011); Amanda R. Szuch, Comment,
Reconsidering Contractual Waivers of the Right to a Jury Trial in Federal Court, 79 U. CIN. L.
REV. 435, 453-59 (2010).
160 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 192-95.
161 See id. at 192; see also U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
162 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 193.
163 See id. at 192-95.
164 See id. at 200.
165 Id.
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To some extent, this type of mechanism already exists, at least
in the context of institutional (administrated) arbitration or in ad
hoc arbitrations proceeding under the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, since UNCITRAL and the various arbitral institutions all
propose standard model clauses that have been well-tested in
courts.1 6 6 However, Rutledge is right to note that there is no
model clause for domestic ad hoc arbitrations similar to that pro-
vided by UNCITRAL in the international context.
E. The First Edition Conclusion
Arbitration and the Constitution includes a short conclusion
that sums up the major themes of the book and outlines various
areas requiring additional research in the future. 1 67 Though brief,
this section offers some interesting ideas and should not be
overlooked.
First, according to Rutledge, "the central lesson of this book is
that constitutional values have not influenced arbitration at the
level of direct doctrinal incorporation." 16 8 Although constitutional
principles have not been directly incorporated into arbitration,
Rutledge nevertheless believes that a number of "subdoctrinal in-
fluences," such as those arising out of international treaties and
due process protocols, exist.16 9 Furthermore, "because the debate
over constitutional principles in arbitration takes place at the sub-
constitutional level," pressure is also exerted by certain "dialogic
influences."1 70 Together, these factors result in "a far greater dia-
logue between institutions of the state as well as with private par-
ties than if the constitutional doctrine occupied the entire field."171
Rutledge then turns to a brief discussion of the ways in which
research in this field might develop in the future. One issue that he
166 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES:
DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 37 (2010); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Model Clause, Annex,
G.A. Res. 65/22, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/22 (Jan. 10, 2011), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2013);
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Model Clause, art. 1, G.A. Res. 31/98, UNCITRAL, 31st Sess.,
Supp. No. 17 at 34, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (Apr. 28, 1976), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
167 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 203-08.
168 Id. at 203.
169 See id. at 205.
170 Id. at 206.
171 Id.
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believes needs more attention involves the question of "why the
form of constitutional influence varies with the issue." 1 72 This sort
of broad-based inquiry would be difficult for most researchers to
undertake, since it requires detailed comparisons of multiple issues
drawn from various fields of arbitration law. However, Rutledge is
correct to identify this as a useful area for future examination,
since such analyses would draw various elements of arbitral law
together into (one assumes) a more cohesive whole."
Rutledge also suggests an increased emphasis on comparative
constitutional law.17 4 Again, his proposals are well taken, since
very little comparative work has been done regarding the ways in
which different countries treat arbitration domestically.'7 5 In many
ways, this gap in scholarship is understandable, since arbitration
can sometimes be viewed as being subject to historical, political
and cultural influences that make comparative analysis difficult.61 7
However, concerns about national distinctiveness have been over-
come in other areas of law, 7 7 which suggests that it would be possi-
172 See id. at 207-08.
173 Alternatively, this discussion could suggest the fragmentation of arbitration law, which
would also be useful to know. Indeed, the field often suffers from the failure to appreciate the
distinctions between the different branches of arbitration, which can result in inappropriately
broad-brushed analyses by courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court. See STRONG, GUIDE,
supra note 13, at 3-5; Strong, First Principles, supra note 15, at 211-41 (discussing factual and
analytical errors made by the Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
1740 (2011), and Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010)).
174 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 207.
175 A significant amount of comparative data already exists regarding national laws relating to
international commercial arbitration. See, e.g., UNCITRAL, Secretariat, The Report on the Sur-
vey Relating to the Legislative Implementation of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/656 (June 5, 2008),
available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/sessions/41st.html (last visited Dec. 1,
2012); BORN, supra note 14, at 1004-57, 2701-2878; FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra
note 48, 629-34, 1666-1716; LEW ET AL., supra note 62, $115-1 to 15-57; S.I. STRONG, RE-
SEARCH AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: SOURCES AND STRAT-
EGIES 88-137 (2009); VAN DEN BERG, supra note 121, at 2-6.
176 At once time, the boundaries of comparative law were narrowly drawn to avoid any issues
that might be subject to political or historical influences. See HAROLD C. GUTTERIDGE, COM-
PARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE METHOD OF LEGAL STUDY & RE-
SEARCH 29 (2d ed. 1949); K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
39 (Tony Weir trans., 1998).
177 For example, constitutional law was itself one time considered to be an inappropriate sub-
ject for comparative study due to the influences of history, culture and politics. See Vicki C.
Jackson, Methodological Challenges in Comparative Constitutional Law, 28 PENN. ST. INT'L L.
REV. 319, 323-26 (2010); David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global
Constitutionalism, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1163, 1169 (2011); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Com-
parative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1270 (1999). However, those qualms have
largely been overcome. See Law & Versteeg, supra, at 1168-70; Tushnet, supra, at 1228-30.
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ble to create an appropriately structured comparative study
regarding the constitutional treatment of arbitration in different le-
gal systems.17 8
III. THE SECOND EDITION (A REVIEWER'S WISH LIST)
The conclusion of Arbitration and the Constitution identifies a
number of areas where additional research is warranted, thereby
opening the door to speculation about other issues that could be
usefully addressed by Rutledge or other commentators, either in
individual articles or in a subsequent edition of this book. Indeed,
a second edition of Arbitration and the Constitution would be very
welcome, since the confluence of arbitration and constitutional law
gives rise to a number of important concerns that would benefit
greatly from Rutledge's comprehensive approach.
Although every reader will have his or her own wish list of
items that merit further attention, four issues come to this re-
viewer's mind as being particularly deserving of Rutledge's schol-
arly consideration. Each is discussed separately below.
A. Scope and Applicability of Constitutional Standards
Relating to Jurisdiction
The first issue that should be included in the second edition of
Arbitration and the Constitution involves the scope and applicabil-
ity of various constitutional standards relating to the jurisdictional
reach of U.S. courts. It is well-established that courts must estab-
lish personal jurisdictionl 79 and, in some cases, subject-matter juris-
178 Functionalism would appear to be a particularly promising methodological approach,
since it allows researchers to look past superficial differences and focus on the operational attrib-
utes of the matter under discussion, a technique that would appear highly appropriate in cases
involving arbitration, which can vary considerably even within a single legal system. See
STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 13, at 4-5 (describing different types of arbitration in the United
States); Strong, First Principles, supra note 15, at 241-45 (discussing core attributes of arbitra-
tion); Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF COMPARATIVE LAw 339, 342, 357 (Mathias Reiman & Reinhard Zimmerman eds., 2006).
Functionalism also "overcomes the epistemic/doctrine difference between civil and common law
by declaring it functionally irrelevant." Id. at 342. However, other comparative methodologies
may also be appropriate. See Tushnet, supra note 177, at 1228-29 (discussing functionalism,
expressivism and bricolage).
179 Personal jurisdiction must be established in both state and federal court. Some states
extend their jurisdictional reach to the full extent permitted by the U.S. Constitution. See CAL.
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diction"so before a particular matter can be adjudicated in
litigation. However, courts are also asked to decide various issues
relating to arbitration,'1 8 ' and questions exist as to whether the con-
stitutional standards for jurisdiction that were developed for use in
litigation can or should apply equally to judicial proceedings con-
nected with arbitration. Because the two types of jurisdiction (per-
sonal and subject-matter) give rise to different sets of concerns,
they are considered separately.
1. Personal Jurisdiction
The scope and content of the various constitutional tests relat-
ing to personal jurisdiction are well-established, with numerous
U.S. Supreme Court opinions describing the standards necessary to
establish specific or general jurisdiction over the person of the de-
fendant. 1 8 2 Judicial guidance also exists regarding the parameters
relating to in rem or quasi-in rem jurisdiction.1 8 3
These standards appear to give rise to few difficulties in situa-
tions involving domestic arbitration. However, problems can arise
in cases that fall under one of the two international treaties com-
monly used to enforce arbitration agreements and awards in the
United States (i.e., the New York Convention or the Inter-Ameri-
can Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, more
commonly known as the Panama Convention).1 84 Here, the core
concern is that constitutional tests for jurisdiction are not men-
Civ. PROC. CODE §410.10 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-3-201 (2012); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302
(2012).
180 Federal courts must establish subject-matter jurisdiction before they can adjudicate a dis-
pute. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, §2; ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 3D §§1063, 3561, 3563 (2012).
181 These matters may arise before, during or after the conclusion of the arbitration itself. See
STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 13, at 37-87. Although some requests for judicial assistance are
inappropriate, some types of court intervention are necessary and consistent with the aims and
structure of arbitration. See Strong, Borders, supra note 79, at 9-17.
182 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, SA v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
414-15 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980); Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
183 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 n.36 (1977).
184 See Panama Convention, supra note 48; New York Convention, supra note 48. Although
the Panama and New York Conventions exhibit a number of important differences, Congress
has indicated that the two treaties are to be construed in a similar manner whenever possible.
See House Report No. 501, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 675,
678; DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 774 F.Supp.2d 66, 71 (D.D.C. 2011); John P. Bowman,
The Panama Convention and its Implementation Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 1, 1-2, 19-20 (2000).
CONSTITUTIONAL CONUNDRUMS
tioned in either of the two treaties as a permissible ground for ob-
jection to the enforcement of an arbitral award and that the
imposition of U.S. law regarding jurisdiction constitutes an addi-
tional and illegitimate obstacle to enforcement proceedings under
the two treaties.8 5
It is perhaps possible to defend the application of U.S. consti-
tutional standards in some cases by relying on Article III of the
New York Convention, which states that "[e]ach Contracting State
shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in ac-
cordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the
award is relied upon."1 8 6  However, Article III also indicates that
the recognition process is to be undertaken pursuant to "the condi-
tions laid down in the following articles," which many commenta-
tors believe should be construed to prohibit the imposition of any
national rule of procedure that would block confirmation or en-
forcement of an award for any reason other than those outlined in
Article V of the Convention.1 87
Although this problem has not often been considered by U.S.
courts, it has arisen a few times in recent years.1 88  Because the
issue reflects a potential conflict between international and consti-
tutional law, judges typically turn to the Supremacy Clause for gui-
185 See Panama Convention, supra note 48, art. 5; New York Convention, supra note 48, art.
V; Monegasque de Reassurances SAM v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488, 498-501 (2d
Cir. 2002); Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarin Co., 284 F.3d 1114,
1120-28 (9th Cir. 2002); Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC "Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory,"
283 F. 3d 208, 214-15 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 101 (2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §487 cmt. c (1987); William W. Park, The
Specificity of International Arbitration: The Case for FAA Reform, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1241, 1263-64 (2003); William W. Park & Alexander A. Yanos, Treaty Obligations and National
Law: Emerging Conflicts in International Arbitration, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 251, 254-56, 264 (2008);
Strong, Invisible Barriers, supra note 5, at 451.
186 New York Convention, supra note 48, art. III.
187 Id. arts. III, V; see also Park, supra note 185, at 1263-64; Park & Yanos, supra note 185, at
254-56, 264; Strong, Invisible Barriers, supra note 5, at 450-52.
188 See First Invest. Corp. of Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, 703 F.3d 742,
749-50 (5th Cir. 2012); Dardana Ltd. v. A.O. Yuganskneftegaz, 317 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2003);
Glencore Grain, 284 F.3d at 1120-28; Base Metal Trading, 283 F. 3d at 214-15; CME Media
Enterprises B.V. v. Zelezny, No. 01 Civ. 1733(DC), 2001 WL 1035138, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
10, 2001).
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dancel 89  and give primacy to the constitutional tests for
jurisdiction. 190
Although some sort of consensus may be building with respect
to the applicability of constitutional standards regarding personal
jurisdiction in some arbitration-related matters, a number of ques-
tions remain open. For example, most of the analysis to date has
taken place in the context of the enforcement of arbitral awards,
and it is unclear whether the same jurisdictional tests can or should
be applied in situations relating to the enforcement of arbitration
agreements or the provision of any sort of interim assistance during
the pendency of the arbitral proceedings. 191 The problem here is
that the language in Article III of the New York Convention that
ostensibly justifies reliance on national procedural law only refers
to enforcement of arbitral awards and is silent regarding any other
type of proceeding. 19 2 Furthermore, this is one of the areas where
the text of the Panama Convention differs from that of the New
York Convention, giving rise to questions as to whether disputes
arising under the two treaties should be construed similarly.' 9 3
Additional concerns arise in cases where personal jurisdiction
is based on Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
commonly referred to as the federal long-arm statute. 194 While this
provision specifically states that jurisdiction may only be exercised
if it is "consistent with the United States Constitution and laws," 1 9 5
189 The U.S. Constitution takes priority over treaties. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §111 cmt. a
(1987); Kesavan, supra note 121, at 1480; Strong, Constitutional, supra note 5.
190 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; First Invest., 703 F.3d at 749-50; Dardana, 317 F.3d at 208;
Glencore Grain, 284 F.3d at 1120-28; Base Metal Trading, 283 F. 3d at 214-15; CME Media, 2001
WL 1035138 at *3-5; Lawrence W. Newman & David Zaslowsky, The Clash Between the New
York Convention and the U.S. Constitution, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 28, 2013; Park, supra note 185, at
1263-64; Park & Yanos, supra note 185, at 254-56, 264; Strong, Invisible Barriers, supra note 5,
at 450-52.
191 See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 13, at 37-87.
192 See New York Convention, supra note 48, art. III; Panama Convention, supra note 48, art.
4; see also BORN, supra note 14, at 2337, 2348, 2400-02, 2714.
193 Compare New York Convention, supra note 48, art. III, with Panama Convention, supra
note 48, art. 4.
194 See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2); Dardana, 317 F.3d at 207-08; Glencore Grain, 284 F.3d at
1127; Base Metal Trading, 283 F.3d at 215; Strong, Invisible Barriers, supra note 5, at 449-51.
195 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) ("For a claim that arises under federal law, serving a summons or
filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant if: (A) the defendant
is not subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts of general jurisdiction; and (B) exercising juris-
diction is consistent with the United States Constitution and laws."). The first element of this
test will always be met in cases falling under the New York or Panama Convention. See 9 U.S.C.
§§203, 302 (2012); Strong, Invisible Barriers, supra note 5, at 449-51.
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"[t]he 4(k)(2) regime has not been constitutionally tested." 1 9 6
Therefore, questions arise not only with respect to the relationship
between Rule 4(k)(2) and the various international treaties relat-
ing to international commercial arbitration, but also with respect to
a second matter, namely whether Rule 4(k)(2) might permit or re-
quire different outcomes depending on whether the court relies on
the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment to establish
the outer boundaries of constitutional due process.1 97 This creates
significant problems in constitutional jurisprudence 9 8 and raises
questions about whether Rule 4(k)(2) should be analyzed under
other constitutional provisions so as to allow the due process
clauses to retain their symmetry.199 Although this debate will pri-
marily be waged in civil procedure circles, it is important to con-
sider whether and to what extent these matters also affect
arbitration.
2. Subject matter jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction is not the only area of concern. Issues
also arise with respect to federal subject-matter jurisdiction, again
primarily in international disputes. Here the difficulties arise as a
result of confusion on the part of some U.S. courts regarding the
applicability of the New York and Panama Conventions to arbitra-
196 John Vail, Six Questions in Light of J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L.
REV. 517, 524-25 (2012). But see Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr, 574 F.3d 1403, 1416-18
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (discussing constitutional issues relating to Rule 4(k)(2) at length in context of a
patent dispute).
197 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; New York Convention, supra note 48; Panama Conven-
tion, supra note 48; FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). The distinction arises because "a federal long-arm
statute in diversity cases [could] be longer than the statute that would apply in state court."
Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L. J. 1, 50 n. 203 (2010); Vail, supra note 196,
at 525 (providing a hypothetical showing the opportunity for different treatment under the two
amendments). Disputes involving international commercial arbitration have been heard in state
court, although in much small numbers than in federal court. See Strong, Borders, supra note 79,
at 2-3. Some states have even enacted their own statutes concerning international commercial
arbitration. See Drahozal, supra note 65, at 101.
198 See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 415 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("To
suppose that 'due process of law' meant one thing in the Fifth Amendment and another in the
Fourteenth is too frivolous to require elaborate rejection."); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 578 (2003) (equating Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process); Vail, supra note 196,
at 525.
199 See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2); Vail, supra note 196, at 525-26 ("The concerns of interna-
tional and interstate relations that territoriality addresses seem less awkwardly addressed by
constitutional provisions other than the Due Process Clauses, such as the Commerce Clause and
federal powers over foreign relations. The Due Process Clauses should retain their symmetry.").
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tions seated in the United States.2 00 According to Sections 203 and
302 of the FAA, federal subject-matter jurisdiction exists in cases
involving the New York and Panama Conventions, respectively. 201
However, some courts fail to appreciate that the two conventions
apply not only in situations involving agreements and awards aris-
ing out of "foreign" arbitrations (i.e., proceedings seated outside
the United States), but also to agreements and awards arising out
of "non-domestic" arbitrations (i.e., proceedings seated in the
United States but involving certain international attributes).20 2
This misunderstanding has led a number of courts to improp-
erly characterize certain matters as falling under Chapter 1 of the
FAA (the "domestic" chapter) rather than Chapter 2 or 3 (the "in-
ternational" chapters). 2 03  This practice is problematic because
Chapter 1 of the FAA, unlike Chapters 2 and 3, does not provide
for federal subject-matter jurisdiction.2 04 Although it might appear
to be easy for parties to an international dispute to establish the
existence of some independent basis for being in federal court, that
is not always the case.20 5
Denial of federal subject-matter jurisdiction in cases involving
the New York and Panama Conventions not only violates the ex-
press terms of the FAA, it could also lead to a breach of interna-
tional law if the matter is dismissed from federal court,2 06 since it is
200 See Richard W. Hulbert, The Case for A Coherent Application of Chapter 2 of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 22 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 45, 46 (2011); see also Park, supra note 185, at 1248.
201 See 9 U.S.C. §§203, 302 (2012). This approach is consistent with constitutional provisions
granting federal courts jurisdictions over treaty-related concerns. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §2;
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 180, §3563.
202 For example, Chapter 2 of the FAA applies to agreements and awards relating to foreign
arbitrations (i.e., arbitrations that are or were seated outside of the United States) and also to
arbitrations that are or were seated within the United States and that arise (1) between a U.S.
and foreign party; (2) entirely between foreign parties; or (3) entirely between U.S. citizens, but
only if there is a sufficient international nexus. See 9 U.S.C. §§2, 202; STRONG, GUIDE, supra
note 13, at 26. A similar test is used in cases falling under Chapter 3. See 9 U.S.C. §302.
203 See 9 U.S.C. §01-307.
204 See id. §§1-16, 203, 302; STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 13, at 24-25; Hulbert, supra note 200,
at 49-50.
205 See Hulbert, supra note 200, at 49-50. For example, a court faced with a matter arising
entirely between non-U.S. parties would run up against constitutional limitations on diversity
jurisdiction. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, §2; 9 U.S.C. §§2, 202; Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 34
(1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 7, 26 (1983); Emirates Int'l Inv. Co. v. ECP Mena Growth Fund, LLC, No. 11 Civ. 9227
(JGK), 2012 WL 2198436, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2012); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 180,
§3604; Hulbert, supra note 200, at 49-50.
206 See 9 U.S.C. §§1-307. A breach of the New York or Panama Convention arises whenever
a court in a country that is bound by the Convention "does not apply the Convention, misapplies
it or finds questionable reasons to refuse recognition or enforcement that are not covered by the
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unclear whether and to what extent the two conventions apply in
U.S. state courts.2 0 7 Indeed, significant questions exist about the
constitutional status of the New York and Panama Conventions, as
discussed in the following subsection.2 0 8
B. Constitutional Status of Treaties Relating to Arbitration
Although parties routinely rely on both the New York and
Panama Conventions in matters proceeding in U.S. courts,2 0 9 the
precise status of the conventions within the U.S. constitutional or-
der remains unclear.2 1 0 Indeed, a circuit split has recently arisen2 11
as to whether the New York Convention is self-executing in na-
ture.2 12 Although the current debate focuses primarily on issues
Convention." ICCA GUIDE, supra note 121, at 30; see also New York Convention, supra note
48; Panama Convention, supra note 48.
207 See New York Convention, supra note 48; Panama Convention, supra note 48; Strong,
Constitutional, supra note 5.
208 See New York Convention, supra note 48; Panama Convention, supra note 48; Strong,
Constitutional, supra note 5.
209 See New York Convention, supra note 48; Panama Convention, supra note 48; Strong,
Borders, supra note 79, at 2-3.
210 See Strong, Constitutional, supra note 5.
211 See ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. plc, 685 F.3d 376, 390-91 (4th Cir. 2012); Safety Nat'l
Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied
sub nom. La. Safety Ass'n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's
London, 131 S. Ct. 65 (2010); Suter v. Munich Reins. Co., 223 F.3d 150, 162 (3d Cir. 2000);
Stephens v. Am. Int'l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995); Strong, Constitutional, supra note 5.
212 The U.S. Supreme Court has suggested in dicta that the Convention is self-executing, al-
though those statements were quite brief and have not been relied upon by the lower courts. See
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491,521-22 (2009); Safety Nat'l, 587 F.3d at 722. The test relating to
self-execution is somewhat convoluted. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 504-32; Foster v. Neilson, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314-15 (1829), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Percheman, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. plc, 685 F.3d 376, 388 (4th Cir. 2012)
(noting the question of self-execution is "murky"); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1985) (describing the test for self-execution as involving "several
factors in discerning the intent of the parties to the agreement: (1) the language and purposes of
the agreement as a whole; (2) the circumstances surrounding its execution; (3) the nature of the
obligations imposed by the agreement; (4) the availability and feasibility of alternative enforce-
ment mechanisms; (5) the implications of permitting a private right of action; and (6) the capa-
bility of the judiciary to resolve the dispute"); Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-
Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 540, 540 (2008); David L. Sloss, Executing Foster v.
Neilson: The Two-Step Approach to Analyzing Self-Executing Treaties, 53 HARV. INT'L L.J. 135,
135 (2012); Carlos Manuel VAzquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 695 (1995); Tim Wu, Treaties' Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 578-79 (2007). The self-
execution analysis is rooted in concepts of constitutional law but also overlaps with questions of
treaty interpretation. See Sloss, supra, at 137.
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relating to international insurance disputes,2 1 3 questions about the
self-executing nature of the New York and Panama Conventions
also affect other areas of arbitral law and practice, including those
relating to form requirements (which describe which arbitration
agreements and arbitral awards fall under the relevant treaties) 214
and manifest disregard of law as a means of vacating an arbitral
award in disputes falling under the treaties.2 1 5
Although commentators have begun to consider the various
issues relating to the constitutional status of the New York Con-
vention, much more work remains to be done in this regard.2 16
Furthermore, even the most preliminary studies have yet to be un-
dertaken with respect to the Panama Convention, even though the
increasing amount of arbitration involving U.S. and Latin Ameri-
can parties suggests that the Panama Convention will become in-
creasingly important in the coming years.2 17 This is an issue of
213 The precise issue involves reverse preemption of the FAA under the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. See 9 U.S.C. §§1-307 (2012); 15 U.S.C. §1012(b) (2012); Cindy Galway Buys & Grant
Gorman, Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung and the Scope of the President's Foreign Affairs
Power to Preempt Words, 32 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 205, 219 (2012); Ronald G. Goss, Can State Laws
Prevent International Arbitration of Insurance Disputes Under the New York Convention?, 65
Disp. RESOL. J. 14, 93 (Nov. 2010-Jan. 2011); Joshua J. Newcomer, International Decision, 105
Am. J. INT'L L. 326, 326-32 (2011); David A. Rich, Deference to the "Law of Nations:" The
Intersection Between the New York Convention, the Convention Act, the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
and State Anti-Insurance Arbitration Statutes, 33 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 81, 84-86 (2010); Michael
J. Ritter, Disputing Arbitration Clauses in International Insurance Agreements: Problems With
the Self-Execution Framework, 3 PACE INT'L L. REV. 40, 41 (2012); Strong, Constitutional, supra
note 5; Aaron L. Wells, When "Yes" Means "No": McCarran-Ferguson, the New York Conven-
tion, and the Limits of Congressional Assent, 12 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 267, 297-98 (2012).
214 See New York Convention, supra note 48, arts. II, IV(1), V(1)(a); Panama Convention,
supra note 48, art. 1; BORN, supra note 14, at 580-81. A longstanding circuit split exists in this
area of law. See S.I. Strong, What Constitutes an "Agreement in Writing" in International Com-
mercial Arbitration? Conflicts Between the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration
Act, 48 STAN. J. INT'L L. 47, 58-78 (2012).
215 See New York Convention, supra note 48; Panama Convention, supra note 48. This issue
has generated a great deal of judicial and scholarly analysis. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767-68 (2010); Hall St. Ass'n, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552
U.S. 576, 584-85 (2008); Telenor Mobile Comic's AS v. Storm LLC, 584 F.3d 396, 407 (2d Cir.
2009); BORN, supra note 14, at 2639-46; RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 47-49; Kenneth R. Davis,
The End of an Error: Replacing "Manifest Disregard" With a New Framework for Reviewing
Arbitral Awards, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 87, 119-31 (2012); Hulbert, supra note 200, at 46-48;
Park, supra note 185, at 1249-54.
216 See Strong, Constitutional, supra note 5.
217 See Panama Convention, supra note 48; Juan M. Alcald, Arbitration in Latin America: A
First Look at the Impact of Legislative Reforms, 13 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 995, 995-1000 (2007).
The Panama Convention prevails over the New York Convention in situations where both con-
ventions apply and a majority of the parties are from countries that are members of the Organi-
zation of American States. See New York Convention, supra note 48; Panama Convention,
supra note 48; 9 U.S.C. §305.
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significant interest to the Organization of American States (OAS),
which has recently undertaken a special training initiative to intro-
duce national judges to the particularities of the Panama
Convention.2 1 8
C. Constitutional Entitlements of States and State Actors
A third set of issues that would benefit from additional re-
search involves the constitutional due process rights of states and
state entities that are participating in judicial proceedings relating
to arbitration.2 19 Analysis of this question often begins with the
U.S. Supreme Court's 1966 decision in South Carolina v. Katzen-
bach.2 2 0 That case denied certain due process rights to sister states
in domestic U.S. litigation on the grounds that "the word 'person'
in the context of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
cannot, by any reasonable mode of interpretation, be expanded to
encompass the States of the Union."2 2 1
The Supreme Court did not have the opportunity to consider
whether this holding had any applicability in the international con-
text prior to 1992. However, the Court refused to take a firm posi-
tion on the issue at that time and simply noted in Republic of
Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. that it was "assuming, without deciding,
that a foreign state is a 'person' for purposes of the Due Process
Clause. "222
Although the statement in Weltover was only made ober dicta,
it was enough to change the lower federal courts' approach to the
due process rights of foreign states.2 23 For example, prior to 1992,
federal courts took the view that foreign states were entitled to the
218 See Panama Convention, supra note 48; see also Organization of American States, Secre-
tariat for Legal Affairs, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, available at http://www.oas.org/
en/sla/dil/docs/InternationalCommercial_ArbitrationBROCHUREEn.pdf (last visited Feb. 3,
2013).
219 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. The question here focuses on whether the defendant
(in this case, a state or state actor) has a constitutionally sufficient number of minimum contacts
to be haled into U.S. court. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987);
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, SA
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
295 (1980); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see supra notes
179-208 and accompanying text.
220 See 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
221 Id. at 323-24.
222 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992).
223 See id.
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full panoply of due process protections under the U.S. Constitu-
tion.2 24 However, that position changed in Price v. Socialist Peo-
ple's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, when the Circuit Court of the
District of Columbia relied on both Katzenbach and Weltover to
conclude that "absent some compelling reason to treat foreign sov-
ereigns more favorably than 'States of the Union,' it would make
no sense to view foreign states as 'persons' under the Due Process
Clause. "225
Soon afterward, the debate about the due process rights of
states and state actors was transferred into the arbitral realm
through a series of decisions relating to the enforcement of arbitral
awards under the New York Convention.22 6 These cases triggered
the same concerns that arise with respect to non-state actors,
namely the need to establish personal jurisdiction over every de-
fendant in every case or controversy, even in matters relating to
arbitration. 2 27 As a result, courts were asked to determine whether
224 See id.; Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d
Cir. 1981); Strong, FSIA, supra note 5, at 341-42.
225 See Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
see also Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619; Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323-24. In reaching this determina-
tion, the court stated that
we think it would be highly incongruous to afford greater Fifth Amendment rights to
foreign nations, who are entirely alien to our constitutional system, than are afforded
to the states, who help make up the very fabric of that system. The States are inte-
gral and active participants in the Constitution's infrastructure, and they both derive
important benefits and must abide by significant limitations as a consequence of their
participation.... However, a "foreign State lies outside the structure of the Union."
... Given this fundamental dichotomy between the constitutional status of foreign
states and States within the United States, we cannot perceive why the former should
be permitted to avail themselves of the fundamental safeguards of the Due Process
Clause if the latter may not.
It is especially significant that the Constitution does not limit foreign states, as it does
the States of the Union, in the power they can exert against the United States or its
government. Indeed, the federal government cannot invoke the Constitution, save
possibly to declare war, to prevent a foreign nation from taking action adverse to the
interest of the United States or to compel it to take action favorable to the United
States. It would therefore be quite strange to interpret the Due Process Clause as
conferring upon Libya rights and protections against the power of federal
government.
Price, 294 F.3d at 96-97 (citations omitted). The fact that the dispute involved a terrorist act
may have been relevant, since the court may have been influenced by a desire not to allow a
morally repugnant act to go unaddressed as a result of a procedural loophole. The terrorism
exception to foreign sovereign immunity, which formerly appeared at 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(7), now
appears at 28 U.S.C. 1605A.
226 See New York Convention, supra note 48; Frontera Resources Azerbaijan Corp. v. State
Oil of Azerbaijan Repub., 582 F.3d 393, 398-401 (2d Cir. 2009); TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop.
Fund of Ukraine, 411 F.3d 296, 299-302 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
227 See supra notes 179-208 and accompanying text.
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and to what extent the constitutional tests for due process applied
to foreign states and state actors.22 8
Although there have only been a limited number of decisions
rendered to date, it appears as if courts are currently inclined to
extend the Katzenbach analysis to arbitration-related proceedings
involving foreign states. 2 2 9 Although some commentary exists on
these and related matters, a number of questions remain unan-
swered.2 3 0 For example, one court has specifically recognized that
the issue of whether and to what extent a state or state-related en-
tity is entitled to foreign sovereign immunity is different than
whether that same actor is entitled to constitutional due process.2 3 1
Further research on this subject would be useful.
Another line of inquiry could consider due process concerns in
arbitration-related proceedings involving domestic state actors.23 2
However, before tackling this issue, it would be necessary for
courts and commentators to reach a better understanding of the
extent to which the U.S. federal government and individual state
governments can enter into arbitration agreements as a matter of
federal or state law.2 33 Both of these are important questions, since
states and state actors are becoming involved in arbitration in in-
228 See Frontera, 582 F.3d at 398-401; TMR Energy, 411 F.3d at 299-302.
229 See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323-24; Frontera, 582 F.3d at 398-401; TMR Energy, 411 F.3d
at 299-302; STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 13, at 90-92. At this point, the only cases that exist have
involved enforcement actions involving foreign states. However, it is possible for similar con-
cerns to arise in other types of judicial proceedings, such as motions to compel arbitration or to
provide some sort of interim relief. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 13, at 37-87 (noting courts
can become involved in the arbitral process before, during and after the hearing); Strong, Bor-
ders, supra note 79, at 9-17 (distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate interventions).
230 See George K. Foster, Collecting From Foreign Sovereigns: The Current Legal Framework
for Enforcing Foreign Arbitral Awards and Court Judgments Against States and Their Instrumen-
talities, and Some Proposals for Its Reform, 25 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 665, 695 (2008); Park &
Yanos, supra note 185, at 271-72; Molly Steele & Michael Heinlen, Challenges to Enforcing
Arbitral Awards Against Foreign States in the United States, 42 INT'L LAW. 87, 90 (2008); Strong,
FSIA, supra note 5, at 335-36; Gosia Spangenberg, Note, The Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction
Over Some Foreign State Instrumentalities Must Be Consistent With Due Process, 81 WASH. L.
REV. 447, 454-57 (2006); Frederick Watson Vaughn, Note, Foreign States are Foreign States:
Why Foreign State-Owned Corporations Are Not Persons Under the Due Process Clause, 45 GA.
L. REV. 913, 938-49 (2011); Pauline Whittinghill & Kyle Pennoyer, Note, A New Frontera? For-
eign Sovereign Immunity, Arbitral Awards and a Waive Goodbye to Assets, 49 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 115, 128-31 (2010).
231 See Frontera, 582 F.3d at 400. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act includes a number
of different provisions that might establish an exception to the immunity of a state or state entity
or instrumentality involved in arbitration. See 28 U.S.C. §§1605(a)(1), 1605(a)(2), 1605(a)(6)
(2012); Strong, FSIA, supra note 5, at 343-54.
232 See Spangenberg, supra note 230, at 453-54.
233 This is an issue that has only received scant scholarly attention. See supra note 61.
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creasing numbers, both domestically and internationally.23 4 Nota-
bly, these discussions could likely be usefully integrated with
Rutledge's existing analyses on separation of powers and the dele-
gation of quasi-judicial authority.2 3 5
D. Constitutional Entitlements to Preclusion Under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause
The fourth and final line of research that might be included in
future editions of Arbitration and the Constitution involves whether
and to what extent the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies to arbi-
tration, both in the context of state actors and non-state actors. 2 3 6
Although federal courts are not required to give full faith and
credit to unconfirmed arbitral awards,2 37 confirmed awards appear
to be given full preclusive effect and recognition under the princi-
ples of full faith and credit.2 38 This distinction between confirmed
and unconfirmed awards appears to carry over to the interstate
context as well.2 39
234 The U.S. government has indicated its willingness to engage in alternative dispute resolu-
tion procedures, including arbitration, in a variety of contexts. See supra note 61 and accompa-
nying text. Foreign states are also becoming increasingly amenable to arbitration in both the
international commercial and investment contexts. See Lew et al., supra note 62, 127-5 to 27-
15, 27-35 to 27-83; Strong, Colombia, supra note 5, at 75-79.
235 See also supra note 61 and accompanying text.
236 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1. The principles of the Full Faith and Credit Clause are ex-
tended to the federal government by statute. See 28 U.S.C. §1738 (2012).
237 See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984).
238 Some analytical variations may arise as a result of whether the award was rendered in
state or federal court and whether it arose under state or federal law. See 9 U.S.C. §13 (2012); In
re Khaligh, 338 B.R. 817, 825 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Jarred Pinkston, In Rem Jurisdiction in an
Action to Confirm and Enforce a Foreign Arbitral Award Generally and Jurisdiction Based Upon
the Presence of a US. Subsidiary Specifically, 30 REV. LrrIG. 415, 438 n. 91 (2011).
239 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 332, 361 (W. Va. 2009); Directory As-
sistants, Inc. v. Cooke, Cameron, Travis and Co., 49 So.3d 1175, 1180 (Ala. Ct. App. 2010);
Infinite Public Relations, LLC v. Rubenstein & Rubenstein, 831 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Table), at *3
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006); Jacobs v. Yale University, No. 277513, 2000 WL 1530030, at *7-8 (Ct. Sup.
Ct. Sept. 21, 2000). However, full faith and credit may be rendered in some jurisdictions even if
an appeal of a confirmation decision is pending. See Tanox, Inc. v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer
& Feld, L.L.P., 105 S.W.3d 244, 270 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) ("While we acknowledge that it is a
close issue, we believe the weight of authority suggests that an arbitration award has preclusive
effect even though an appeal of the award is pending. As discussed below, courts have con-
cluded this because an arbitration award has the same effect as a final judgment; in fact, courts
have held that an arbitration award can have preclusive effect, even though it is not confirmed
and a judgment is not entered.").
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However, there is very little research available generally on
preclusion in arbitration, particularly in the constitutional con-
text.2 4 0  Furthermore, it appears that some types of judicial deci-
sions, such as those relating to arbitrability, may not be subject to
the same degree of deference under a Full Faith and Credit analy-
sis as confirmation of an arbitral award.24 1 Some distinctions might
also be made based on the types of claims at issue2 4 2 or the number
of parties involved.2 43 Additional research on any or all of these
issues would be very useful.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the preceding shows, arbitration intersects with constitu-
tional law in a significant number of ways. These areas of overlap
trigger questions of fundamental import, including those regarding
core structural concerns (ranging from separation of powers and
federalism concerns in the first edition to treaty interpretation and
interstate preclusion issues in the much-anticipated second edition)
as well as those relating to a number of individual liberties (such as
the right to a jury trial and perhaps the ability to proceed as a
class). Indeed, arguments have even been based on the First
Amendment.2 4 4
Although these connections appear self-evident when
presented in Arbitration and the Constitution, the ease with which
Rutledge introduces these issues belies the novelty of his basic pre-
mise, namely that arbitral concerns can and should be considered
from a constitutional perspective. Indeed, after reading this book,
it appears strange that no one has thought to put arbitration within
a comprehensive constitutional framework before this time. There
may be a number of reasons for this oversight, including arbitra-
tion's (now hopefully outmoded) reputation as a practical rather
than doctrinal discipline or the dearth of constitutional scholars
who are equally adept in arbitration law, but none of these expla-
240 See BORN, supra note 14, at 2880-2915; STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 13, at 85-87.
241 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1; Rourke v. Amchem Products, Inc., 863 A.2d 926, 940 (Md.
2004). But see id. at 948 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
242 See Cho v. Am. Bonding Co., 951 P.2d 468, 470-74 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
243 See Kramer v. Co. of Nassau, 783 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
244 See U.S. CONsT. amend. I; Del. Coalition for Open Gov't v. Strine, 894 F. Supp.2d 493 (D.
Del. 2012, on appeal, No. 12-3859 (3d. Cir.)); Joyce, supra note 9, at 12; S.I. Strong, Limits of
Procedural Choice of Law, 39 BROOK. J. INT'L L. _ (forthcoming 2014).
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nations can be used to justify a continued lack of attention to arbi-
tration's constitutional implications.
Therefore, it would seem that Arbitration and the Constitution
constitutes one of those few pieces of scholarship that really opens
the door to a new way of thinking about a particular issue. While
the combination of arbitration and constitutional law may not yet
be as predictable as Mom and apple pie, the visionary work of Pro-
fessor Peter Rutledge has been invaluable in introducing this im-
portant subject to audiences in the United States and beyond.
